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PRC Analyzes New U.S., Soviet Arms Control Attitudes Seen From INF Treaty
40050161 Beijing MEIGUO YANJIU [AMERICAN STUDIES] in Chinese No 2, 1 May 88 pp 135-143

[Article by Yu Zhiyong: "A Look at the New Changes in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control from the Perspective of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty"]

[Text] After more than 6 years of difficult negotiation, the United States and the Soviet Union finally concluded an agreement eliminating all intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, which was formally signed by the two countries' heads of state at a summit meeting in Washington, D.C. The political and military significance of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty has already been fully discussed in many commentaries. Thus this article will seek merely to examine a number of new changes that have occurred in U.S.-Soviet approaches to arms control.

I. Changes in U.S. and Soviet Strategic Thinking

While it is true that the United States and the Soviet Union were able to conclude the INF Treaty, the first agreement genuinely reducing nuclear missiles, because of Soviet concern that American medium-range missiles could strike targets inside the Soviet Union, whereas the Soviet counterparts could not reach the United States and because of various American economic and domestic political considerations, the effects engendered by changes in nuclear strategy by the two sides also contributed significantly to the conclusion of the agreement. Naturally, the material basis underlying these changes was the impetus generated by advances in high technology.

The United States leads the Soviet Union in high technology and thus began to change her strategy earlier than the Soviets. The beginning of this change was marked by the 23 March 1983 unveiling of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" [SDI] by President Reagan. The gradual shift in American strategy from "mutual assured destruction" to "assured survival" over the past several years has by no means been smooth sailing and has encountered challenges on all sides. First of all, the Soviet Union has used one ploy after another to shoot down SDI. Second, there is resistance within the United States, including not only opposition from the public and from scientists but, more importantly, funding limits on SDI imposed by the U.S. Congress, which "controls the purse strings." Third, the technological obstacles that SDI has encountered during its testing phase have also affected its fate from time to time. Yet even so, the change that is occurring in American strategy has not been reversed.

During the INF Treaty negotiations, SDI withstood the test of intense pressure applied by the Soviets, who first attempted to link SDI to the INF Treaty negotiations and then shifted tactics to claim that SDI violated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, hoping either to shoot down SDI or at least to delay its deployment. But Reagan

refused to budge and finally managed to conclude an SDI-decoupled INF Treaty. He remained so unyielding that SDI has been dubbed his "baby." But the "doting" displayed by the mainstream of the American ruling class toward SDI suggests that the program is really *its* "baby." In Reagan's words, "SDI will form the cornerstone of American security strategy in the 1990s and beyond. It is not a bargaining chip to be used in negotiations with the Soviets but a way to strengthen future American security."¹ It appears that, having weathered the tests of the INF Treaty and the Washington summit, the change in American strategy is firmly under way and that SDI, a product of this change, is more secure than ever and will continue to be implemented.

The Soviet Union has committed considerable human and financial resources to the development of space weapons but is generally considered to trail the United States in space defense technology; thus she began to change her strategy later than the Americans. Nevertheless, the Soviets evidenced two striking changes during the INF Treaty negotiations and around the time of the Washington summit. First, Gorbachev and Soviet military leaders propounded a theory of "adequate defense," which may be summarized in Gorbachev's words: "We will not take any step beyond those required for reasonable and adequate defense."² Second was a shift from the previous effort to vilify the purpose of America's SDI program to an open admission that the Soviet Union has a program that is similar to SDI. As Gorbachev put it, "We are carrying out research which includes some of the matters the United States proposes to treat as defensive."³ These changes indicate that Soviet strategy is also beginning to shift.

On balance, except for the general time lag between American advances and Soviet efforts to catch up—which also obtains in this case, there are many similarities in the way U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies have developed. This shows that the impetus generated by technological development not only fuels the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race but also determines the content and trend of the race. For the moment, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union alone cannot do anything of their own free wills to change this fact.

Moreover, in discussing the preliminary changes that have occurred in American and Soviet strategic thinking, one must also note that those changes are just beginning to manifest themselves and are merely suggestive of a possible trend. Both countries still—and will for years to come—continue to rely on the strategy of deterrence using strategic offensive weapons.

II. "Trust but Verify"

In his remarks at the ceremony for the signing of the INF Treaty, Reagan said to Gorbachev in both Russian and English, "Trust but verify," evoking a chorus of laughter

from the audience. And as Gorbachev retorted, Reagan "repeat[s] that at every meeting."⁴ Clearly, Reagan's statement was not a joke but a serious point that requires further analysis.

The United States and the Soviet Union have sharply disagreed and been far apart on the issues of trust and verification. The Americans believe that the Soviet Union cannot be trusted and that arms control agreements with the Soviets require provisions for stringent verification. Thus [for the Americans] verification is premised on distrust of the Soviet Union, is an indispensable measure by which to prevent Soviet cheating and also serves to build trust. The Soviets, on the other hand, have argued that verification is premised on the belief that signatories intend to observe their agreements, that distrust can arise only when there is conclusive evidence of cheating, and thus that verification should be limited to the extent to which it is "adequate." Brezhnev once told Nixon: "If we are trying to trick one another, why do we need a piece of paper?"⁵ Clearly, the United States and the Soviet Union differ in their views of the premises of verification. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has always insisted on "adequate verification," agreed to permit only that which is obtainable through national means, and opposed on-site inspection. The Americans, on the other hand, have distinguished two types of verification, and different U.S. administrations have insisted on different types of verification. For example, the Nixon administration used "adequate verification" as the standard for its arms control agreements, as Nixon specified in the instructions he issued to the SALT I negotiating team: "No arms limitation agreement can ever be absolutely verifiable. The relevant test is not an abstract ideal, but the practical standard of whether we can determine compliance adequately to safeguard our security—that is, whether we can identify attempted evasion if it occurs on a large enough scale to pose a significant risk, and whether we can do so in time to mount a sufficient response. Meeting this test is what I mean by the term 'adequate verification.'"⁶

The Reagan administration has differed from its predecessors, arguing that "adequate verification" is insufficient and ambiguous. Charging that the SALT II accord signed by his predecessor was "fatally flawed," he rejected "adequate verification" as a standard, adopting "effective verification" in its stead. What is the real distinction between these two standards? The Reagan administration has issued no formal clarification. But in both theory and practice the distinction is significant.

In terms of theory, "adequate verification" is favored by the so-called "substantive school," whereas "effective verification" is the darling of the "legalistic school." The substantive school argues that both the United States and the Soviet Union possess sizable nuclear arsenals which are roughly equal, that only "substantive" cheating can markedly affect the strategic balance, and that such cheating cannot escape detection by national means of verification. In testimony on the SALT II treaty, then U.S.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said: "In short, there is a double bind which serves to deter Soviet cheating. To go undetected, any Soviet cheating would have to be on so small a scale that it would not be militarily significant. Cheating on such a level would hardly be worth the political risks involved. On the other hand, any cheating serious enough to affect the military balance would be detectable in sufficient time to take whatever action the situation required."⁷ The legalistic school, on the other hand, argues that any treaty violation, even if minor in military or strategic terms, is very serious, because it is an indication of the willingness of a party to an agreement to comply with that agreement and thus of his credibility. The legalistic school also argues that small violations of an agreement can be used to test the resolve of another party, for "a dike a thousand *li* long can be burst by a single ant hole." Toleration of small violations may embolden the cheater and undermine the tolerator's credibility in insisting on compliance.

In terms of practice, "adequate verification" is rooted principally in national means of detection and does not require the more stringent method, on-site inspection, whereas "effective verification" requires both so as to ensure strict compliance and to eliminate the possibility that any unverifiable doubt might arise.

In view of these distinctions, two crucial conditions had to be fulfilled for the INF Treaty, which included "the most stringent verification system ever,"⁸ to be concluded: Soviet agreement to accept on-site inspection, and revision or masking by the Americans of their extremely conservative preconditions on verification so as to lay the groundwork for a new verification system. The Soviet Union reversed her traditional approach and policy and happily acceded to on-site inspection. Faced with this dramatic about-face, Reagan could not very well proclaim distrust of the Soviet Union, so adjustments were made in the relationship between verification and trust. Thus on the issue of verification, not only did a change occur in the Soviet position, a subtle shift also occurred on the American side, whose premise on verification was amended from open proclamation of distrust of the Soviets to "trust but verify."

III. Asymmetric Reduction: A Precedent in U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Arms Control Agreements

In accordance with the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union is to destroy 1,752 missiles and 2,572 warheads, and the United States is to destroy 859 missiles and 859 warheads. This means that the Soviet Union will destroy 104 percent more missiles and 199.4 percent more warheads than the United States. Quantitatively, the gap is considerable and unprecedented in treaties providing for asymmetric nuclear arms reductions. Thus many American arms control experts believe the concept of asymmetrical reductions pioneered in the INF Treaty was a major gain for the United States. These experts believe this because the INF Treaty is just the first step in nuclear arms reduction, and the concept of asymmetrical

reduction will prove profoundly significant if it can be applied to future agreements providing for deep cuts in nuclear and conventional arms.

On balance, the Soviet Union holds a numerical advantage in weapons, whereas the United States leads in technology. Quantitatively, the Soviet Union has an edge in chemical and conventional forces. Thus the Americans attach great importance to the precedent of asymmetry which was established in the INF Treaty and hope to apply the principle in future military reduction agreements so as to achieve their goal of getting the Soviet Union to make greater cuts, thereby eliminating the Soviet numerical advantage while preserving the American qualitative edge. Wary, the Soviets have warned the United States not to attempt to force the Soviet Union into making unilateral reductions but, on the other hand, believe that they can also gain some advantage from the principle of asymmetry, because the United States holds a quantitative edge in strategic offensive warheads, so if an agreement to reduce strategic offensive arsenals by 50 percent is reached the United States would have to eliminate more warheads [than the Soviets].

In short, the United States and the Soviet Union each has her own calculus regarding asymmetrical reduction, but it is the Americans who are more enamored of the concept. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there were exceptional reasons behind the Soviet decision to give ground on asymmetrical reductions in the INF Treaty, namely, that the Soviets were willing to concede greater cuts in their medium-range missile arsenal, which could not strike the United States, in exchange for elimination of the threat posed by American medium-range missiles to Soviet territory. In other arms control spheres, the factor that induced the Soviet Union to make concessions on asymmetrical cuts in the INF Treaty will by no means be present, and neither will the Americans be willing to sit back and let the Soviet Union turn the concept of asymmetry around to obtain her aims. So while the principle may give some hope to the two sides, it will probably end up bringing even greater contradictions and more intense struggles over this issue.

IV. Conclusion

The preliminary changes that have occurred in U.S. and Soviet strategic thinking mean first of all a gradual shift in the direction of the arms race from the development of strategic offensive arms to selective development of strategic defense systems. If the primary movement prior to SALT I was toward amassing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the major impetus after SALT II during the 1970s was toward improving arsenal quality, then the major direction of the arms race in the future will be toward strategic defense systems. Second, the shift in strategy has made a positive contribution toward deep reductions in nuclear weapons. The completed INF Treaty and the treaty to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent, which is now being negotiated, may be said to be closely related to the shift in strategy, which has made

things that seemed impossible a few years ago become a partial reality or about to become reality. Thus we must prepare ourselves mentally for the possibility of deep U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms reductions but, of course, also avoid becoming overly optimistic about that possibility by overlooking the facts that the United States and the Soviet Union still rely on deterrence and that their nuclear arms race will continue for quite a long time to come. For only the focus and principal direction of the race have changed; the shift in American strategy, having withstood the intense pressure applied by the Soviets during the INF Treaty negotiations and the summit, will strengthen and continue; and Soviet strategy clearly has also begun to change. Thus future arms control effort faces both more opportunities and more challenges. Because of the Soviet Union's slight lag behind the United States in strategic defense systems, the Soviet-U.S. space race has been compared to the race between the tortoise and the hare. What distinguishes the real race from the fairy tale, however, is that the real "rabbit" is a wary critter and the real "tortoise" is not only tenacious but none too slow, either. Only the future will tell who will cross the finish line first.

The Soviet changes on the issue of verification during the INF Treaty negotiations have been the focus of world attention. But in reality the United States also made some changes on this issue, although this has not attracted much note. These changes are important because they meet the need and have laid the foundation for a new verification system. Conversely, in this new era, which requires that the two sides cooperate to some extent to establish an effective verification system, "trust but verify"—albeit probably not voiced from the bottom of America's heart—is emblematic of the fact that the United States has been forced to change her extremely conservative stance on verification, which was premised on distrust of the Soviet Union. The changes made by both sides also indicate that both now incline toward "effective" and "stringent" standards and that "adequate verification" will no longer be the basis for future arms control agreements. This change was made possible by breakthroughs on the previously off-limits issue of on-site inspection but was also objectively necessary for the achievement of a genuine reduction in nuclear arsenals.

The precedent for asymmetric reductions established by the INF Treaty is indeed significant, but on the whole the principle is more advantageous to the United States, which can be expected to exploit the principle in negotiations on control of chemical and conventional weapons to pressure the Soviet Union to make more cuts so as to eliminate Soviet quantitative advantage in these systems. And while the Soviet Union will try to use the principle to her greatest advantage, she absolutely will not allow the Americans to manipulate it as they please. Thus the principle probably will not produce the results the Americans and Soviets and expect but rather will lead to more quarrelsome wrangling.

Footnotes

1. CANKAO XIAOXI, 17 January 1988.

2. Ibid., 22 November 1987.
3. Ibid., 16 December 1987.
4. RENMIN RIBAO, 9 December 1987.
5. Michael Krepon, "Arms Control Verification and Compliance," New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1984, pp. 14-15.
6. Ibid., p 17
7. Allan S. Krass, "Verification: How Much Is Enough?" Sipri, Taylor & Francis, 1985, p 142.
8. CANKAO XIAOXI, 5 December 1987.

Implications of Soviet Unilateral Arms Reduction Examined

*HK1203083089 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
9 Mar 89 p 9*

[Article by Guo Zhengping: "Gorbachev: Conventional Arms Reduction at a First Try"]

[Text] At the UN Assembly toward the end of last year, Soviet leader Gorbachev announced that, the Soviet Union is to reduce half a million of its troops and voluminous conventional arms in 2 years. Then, the USSR announced a cutback of its military expenditures by 14.2 percent at the beginning of this year. These two major Soviet actions have brought strong repercussions from all sides.

An Undertone With Three Implications

Our first impression of the Soviet decision on arms reduction was that it sounded clear and crisp. Upon closer study, we found that the decision has three implications in its undertone. The first implication is "unilateral reduction"—with no bargaining with any other countries; it is going to "act on its own." The second implication is "reduction by a wide margin"—cutting back by 500,000 troops, which account for 12 percent of the Soviet Armed Forces. In addition, it will also "greatly reduce its conventional arms," including 10,000 tanks, 8,500 cannons, and 800 fighter planes deployed in the European parts of the USSR and other East European countries. And the third implication is "omnidirectional reduction"—reduced will be 240,000, 200,000, and 60,000 troops in the Western war zone, the Far East war zone, and Southern war zone respectively. Following in the footsteps of the USSR, Hungary, Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria have, one by one, announced arms reductions and cutbacks in military expenditures. This series of disarmament actions have really made people think that there are too many things for the eye to take in.

One Stone Killing Three Birds

At present, arms reduction is an important part in the strategic category of national security as well as a sensitive area with the overlapping of politics, diplomacy, and military affairs. Gorbachev has thrown one stone to kill three birds.

First, it serves to push forward domestic reform. The USSR has been carrying out reform for 3 years without any significant improvement in the economy. The 1988 economic growth rate is likely to be less than 1 percent. One of the important reasons is the mammoth size of its army. Consequently, its military expenditures could be an annual \$200 billion, accounting for 16 or 18 percent of its gross national product, and one-third of the government financial expenditures. It seems that Gorbachev intends to change the basic principle of "cannons come first, butter comes next," which the USSR has all along pursued, so that fruits of the reform may be seen as quickly as possible.

Second, it serves to further open up the diplomatic situation. The USSR pulling its troops from Eastern Europe is conducive to somewhat relieving Western Europe's anxieties over the USSR. Cutting back Soviet troops stationed in the Far East aims at creating a healthy atmosphere for the Sino-Soviet summit to be held soon. Besides, this is to show the new U.S. President Bush that the USSR is willing to push forward the disarmament talks, and to maintain the momentum of relaxation.

And third, it serves to readjust Soviet military strategy. The USSR said that the Soviet concept of security has changed from the past concept of absolutely guaranteeing its own security to "simultaneously taking into consideration the security of the other side, the security shared with the other side, and mutual trust." Armament building has also changed from the past concept characterized by the more, the better to "maintaining the level of rational sufficiency." In addition, a reshuffle involving some 20 senior officers at and above military region levels was conducted within a short span of 2 months. Most eye-catching was the appointment of the 50-year-old Colonel General Moiseyev as Chief of the General Staff to replace Marshal Akhromeyev. This has supported the strength of the reform. No wonder public opinion believes that Gorbachev's decision on arms reduction is a fabulous move.

A Move Affecting Three Aspects

Internationally, Gorbachev's decision on arms reduction has played the role of affecting three aspects with one move:

First, it has stimulated the enthusiasm of West European countries. Heads of various West European countries have welcomed this, while pointing out the fact that the

USSR will continue to enjoy its superiority in conventional arms after its arms reduction. Twenty three members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization began the European arms talks on 6 March, and the two sides have reached an initial accord on the principle, items, and regions for arms reduction. Some people believe that, the prospects of conventional arms reduction are bright under the present political climate.

Second, it has touched U.S. "sensitive nerves." Europe has been the strategic key in U.S.-Soviet contention. The United States believes that the Soviet strategic goal aims to elbow it out of Europe. On this basis, it believes that the USSR is doing its best to sow discord in U.S.-European relations. The United States found that Western Europe has been over zealous about the Soviet decision, and that they too readily believe the USSR under the sweep of its peace offensive. West Germany has even openly clashed with the United States over the issue of updating short range ballistic missiles; and the West European countries granted loans to the USSR of approximately \$10 billion last year. Under such circumstances, the United States leans toward a "cold treatment" in U.S.-Soviet relations. President Bush has announced the need for 3 months to reassess policies. From a geopolitical angle, the United States has ascertained that the USSR will always be its most powerful opponent no matter how it changes its spots. Moreover, the United States is not without doubts about the prospects of Gorbachev's reform. Therefore, arduous work is ahead for the United States and West Europe in harmonizing their policies toward the USSR.

And third, it has pushed forward the world situation to continue to develop in the direction of relaxation. The Soviet decision on unilateral arms reduction falls in line with the general trend by which talks are replacing confrontation, and is objectively favorable to world peace and development. People will naturally welcome the USSR going along this line.

Soviet CFE Proposals Called 'Challenge' to U.S.
OW1103133689 Beijing XINHUA in English
1050 GMT 9 Mar 89

["News Analysis: Vienna Talks: Both a Chance and Challenge to U.S. (by Wei Guoqiang)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, March 8 (XINHUA)—The Soviet Union's latest proposal for cutting conventional armament of the West and East in Europe, which heralds the conventional forces in Europe (CFE) talks scheduled for tomorrow in Vienna, provides both a chance and a challenge for the United States.

The Soviets seem more eager to reach an agreement on the conventional disarmament to continue the current detente momentum or the purpose of their domestic reform.

The proposal, presented by the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the opening session of the follow-up meeting of the European Security and Cooperation Conference last Monday, calls for reduction of the land armies and tactical warplanes of the East and West massed in Europe to 10 to 15 percent below NATO's current levels within three years.

The CFE talks, which come at a time when world tension is relaxing as a result of an INF Treaty between the two superpowers and will discuss the reduction of non-nuclear weapons and personnel massed in Europe, are something sought by the United States and the Soviet Union to meet their political and economic needs.

For the United States, it can certainly seize upon the chance to press the Soviet Union for bigger concession in troop reduction. Meanwhile, a dramatic reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe will also help the United States weaken the Soviet-East European relations.

The U.S. intention can be found in Monday's speech by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, who, while expressing welcome to the new Soviet proposal for conventional disarmament in Europe, urged the Soviet Union to give up the "Brezhnev Doctrine".

It is believed that Baker's call indicated the U.S. attempt to use the negotiations to bring the "Finlandization" to East European countries.

Moreover, an agreement on the reduction of troops in Europe, if reached, would be also beneficial to the U.S. effort to cut back its huge federal deficits and ease the pressure for a withdrawal of 300,000 strong U.S. troops from Europe.

However, the Americans fear that once an agreement on the conventional disarmament is reached by the two military groups, the "Gorbachev fever", which is prevailing in Western Europe, will grow further, as the West Europe has shown increasing interest in various Soviet peace proposals and taken some initiatives to promote the development of East-West relations.

The United States worries that if the West European countries take more initiatives to develop their political and economic relations with the Soviet Union and East European countries, the U.S. demand for strengthened defense in Europe, and maintaining and modernization of NATO's battlefield nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe will meet stronger objections. And furthermore, the differences between the United States and Western Europe over the assessment of the Soviet strategic intention and over what strategy the West should adopt to deal with the Soviet Union will be widened.

For all these reasons, analysts believed, the United States may have no choice but to increase its consultations with its allies for a united position so as to make full use of the chance and try its best to deal with the challenge.

U.S. Caution over CFE Talks Viewed

*OW1703052189 Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin
0530 GMT 10 Mar 89*

[From the "International News and Current Events" program]

[Text] The following is a news analysis entitled "U.S. Gratification With and Worries Over the Conventional Arms Cuts in Europe" written by (Wei Guoqiang), reporter of the XINHUA News Agency.

At a meeting of foreign ministers of the European Security Conference on 6 March, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze presented a new arms cuts proposal, calling on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and the Warsaw Treaty Organization [WTO] to reduce their respective military strength to the level of 85 to 90 percent of the current NATO military strength within the next 3 years.

U.S. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker immediately welcomed the Soviet proposal. Some personages in the United States and in the West believe that the Soviet proposal has a great deal in common with the stand persistently maintained by the West over a long period of time. However, Baker also warned U.S. allies that they should not be cheated by the Soviet arms cuts proposal, which appears thorough but unrealistic.

The European conventional arms reduction conference was held after detente appeared in international situation following the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Due to its consideration for the needs of reform and development for maintaining the trend of detente, the Soviet Union seems more eager to reach an arms cuts agreement with the countries in the West. So far as the United States is concerned, the large-scale reduction of conventional arms in Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union will be conducive to security of the West in terms of military threat; in terms of political maneuver, the West will have more opportunities that can be exploited in relations between the Soviet Union and East Europe. Therefore, the United States would very much like to take advantage of Soviet eagerness to force the latter to make more concessions.

Besides, the U.S. domestic demand for trimming military expenditures and the presence in Europe is also mounting day by day. If an agreement can be reached with the Soviet Union on reducing conventional arms in Europe, it would also help the United States alleviate its financial crisis.

However, the United States is not entirely free of misgivings and doubts regarding the prospect of reaching an agreement. The United States is worried that once an agreement is reached on conventional arms reduction, Gorbachev's popularity will further increase in West Europe. The West European countries will take even

more initiatives to develop their political and economic relations with the Soviet Union and East Europe. Furthermore, the need by the United States to continue to strengthen its defense and maintain and renovate tactical nuclear weapons deployed in West Europe will meet with even greater resistance. The United States and West Europe will inevitably further widen their differences over their estimate of the Soviet strategic intentions and their strategy against the Soviet Union.

In addition, the talks on conventional arms reduction cover a very wide range. The issues concerning the areas of troops and arms reduction and their verifications are also very complicated. Coupled with the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union do not trust each other and that both sides never lower their guard against each other, people predict that, under the current international situation, it would be very unlikely for the conference to reach an agreement in the near future.

Commentary Sees CFE Talks' Prospects as More Hopeful than MBFR's

*HK2203121789 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
13 Mar 89 p 3*

["International Outlook" Column by Zheng Yuanyuan:
"It Is Necessary To Erect a Bridge of Trust"]

[Text] The 3-day opening ceremony for the Europe conventional arms talks and the negotiations on the establishment of confidence- and security-building measures has come to an end in Vienna and talks on substantive matters have begun. Compared with the fruitless 15-year negotiations on "Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction" in Central Europe, (known to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as the Conference on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe) these talks and negotiations have two special features. First, there is a better atmosphere. At Hofburg Palace, one does not see people blaming or hurling accusations at each other, as one often did during past arms reduction talks. Rather, one sees people discuss matters calmly and in good humor and representatives from various countries jointly explore new ways of reducing arms in Europe. Second, the number of countries represented is so large that it is even unprecedented in the history of arms reduction in Europe. Apart from the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), 35 members (many of which are neutral or nonaligned countries) of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) also participate in discussions at the negotiations on the establishment of confidence- and security-building measures. The fact that so many European countries participate in the talks and negotiations shows that they pay close attention to and are concerned about arms reduction in Europe.

At the talks, the WTO and NATO have each produced their own arms reduction proposals. Of course, there are many differences between these two proposals. However, there is also something basically common between them. For example, they share the view that it is necessary to put an end to the unbalanced possession of conventional arms, that troops and conventional arms should be drastically reduced, and that the structural organization of conventional arms should be made defensive in nature. To be sure, people never dreamed that all the long-standing difficult problems surrounding disarmament could be resolved through one meeting, nor did they ever dream that the road of negotiations, which is covered by a pox of pitfalls and quagmires and overgrown with brambles, could be easily traversed. This time, however, at the talks, the two sides, acting in the spirit of seeking common ground, have produced more practical disarmament proposals, thus bringing about a reconciliatory atmosphere. From this, people have seen a ray of hope and they now have greater confidence in disarmament. As pointed out by some Western observers, this reconciliatory atmosphere is even more important than reaching a particular agreement. The reason is that given this atmosphere, the arms reduction talks may proceed beyond the prolonged impasse, which is characterized by "dialogues of the deaf." British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe indicated: There is now indeed "a feeling of hopefulness." Many representatives to the talks have also suggested that these talks could mean a good start for the termination of the division of Europe and for the cultivation of trust and understanding.

Inseparable from this good start is the trend toward relaxation in East-West relations. In addition, this also shows that the European peoples are now no longer willing to let their countries remain places where the superpowers contend with each other or to let their territories remain the arsenals of the two military blocs. In addition, whether in Eastern or Western Europe, all the countries without exception feel the pressure from

economic competition. To spend much money on arms is to go against the trends of the times. The sensible thing for them to do is to use manpower and financial resources to develop their economies and augment their strength. The European peoples' strong desire for peace and disarmament is the strong force that has pushed the two superpowers to the conference table.

Historical experience tells the author of this article that the success, or failure, of future arms reduction talks depends on mutual understanding and trust. The cold war and confrontations over the past 40 years have produced an iceberg of suspicion between Eastern and Western Europe. That was evidenced by the suspicion, the vigilance, and the attitude of never yielding a single inch on the part of the participants in the arms control talks. The 45 rounds of the "Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe" held in the 15 years since they were initiated in 1973 had all begun with accusations and ended with disputes, with the result that the quantity of arms did not decrease, but increased, in those years. They tried to outdo each other and the total amount of arms spiraled. One must say that this is a tragedy for Europe as well as something that calls for rethinking in the history of disarmament.

Of course, we should also clearly see that we still have to go through a long, tortuous process before genuine trust and understanding can be established. An iceberg cannot evaporate overnight. Before the United States and the Soviet Union give up their contention for Europe, this contention will remain an important factor that affects the talks. Therefore, the peoples and governments of various European countries should continue to work hard toward disarmament in Europe. However, we still can afford to be optimistic. Since the winds of relaxation have found their way into the conference hall in Vienna, people have every reason to expect the arrival of spring, when the ice melts in Europe.

INTRABLOC

Warsaw Pact Experts Working Group Discusses Mediterranean 'Situation'

*AU0903195189 Sofia BTA in English
1849 GMT 9 Mar 89*

[Text] Sofia, March 9 (BTA)—A session of the working group of experts of the Warsaw Treaty-member countries was held in Sofia on March 8-9 for analysis of the situation in the Mediterranean and further development of considerations and proposals concerning the ways for its improvement.

Mr Ivan Ganey, deputy foreign affairs minister met the participants in the meeting.

BULGARIA

Bulgarian Envoy Petrov Addresses Plenary Session on CSBMs

*AU1003075389 Sofia BTA in English
2322 GMT 9 Mar 89*

["New Type of Confidence-Building Measures"—BTA headline]

[Text] Vienna, March 9 (BTA spec. corr.)—At the first plenary session of the second stage of the European security conference the leader of the Bulgarian delegation Mr Lyuben Petrov put forward a proposal for new types of measures for strengthening of confidence and security in Europe. Co-authors of the proposals are the delegations of the GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The proposal is supported by all seven delegations of the socialist countries attending the talks.

There is an organic link between the measures for strengthening of confidence and security in the military sphere and the efforts for reduction of armies and armaments, pointed out the Bulgarian representative. He said that the advance in the sphere of measures for confidence and security strengthening would accelerate the process in the sphere of reduction of armies and conventional weapons in Europe, as well as the resolution of other questions of disarmament.

The proposal envisages an overall programme of measures including all aspects of military activity on land and the adjacent sea and ocean areas, as well as in the air above them. Measures are envisaged for the establishing of zones of trust and security in Europe.

Special attention is paid to the measures having limiting character which could provide the securing of predictability of the actions of the countries, would decrease the common anxiety in connection with the manoeuvres and movement of armies, which in their character and scale are often hard to tell from the preparation for real military actions.

A number of points in the document aim at broadening the openness and glasnost in the military sphere.

In the preparation of the proposal the new political situation has been taken in consideration, created after the entering into force of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, after the realization of the unilateral reduction of the armies of the Warsaw Treaty member-states, with the successful completion of the Vienna meeting, and with the accumulated positive experience from the implementation of the Stockholm agreements, stressed the Bulgarian representative.

The proposal submitted by Bulgaria is concrete and realistic and corresponds completely to the principles and criteria of the mandate of the talks, of the already implemented Stockholm agreements, added the speaker.

In accordance with the rules of the adopted procedures the full text of the proposal was circulated among the participants in the talks.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

NATO Stress on Armor, Artillery Reductions in CFE Criticized

*AU1303084789 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
8 Mar 89 p 7*

[Jan Kovarik article in the "We Comment" column: "Joint Responsibility"]

[Excerpts] The Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and the talks on strengthening confidence and security in Europe are, from the very first day of the deliberations of the ministers of foreign affairs of the 35 signatory states of the Final Act, under the sign of the Soviet proposal to reduce in three stages of conventional armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals to a level ensuring defense. Thus, what is involved in the initiative delivered by Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze is a substantial reduction in the number of troops on both sides, as well as transforming the remaining units into formations which have a strictly defensive mission. Some observers assert that the West expected a similar step, but the reaction to it, be it by American Secretary Baker or British Minister Howe, attests to the fact that NATO actually stands with empty hands here. There is agreement in the demand to arrive at lower levels of the two sides' military forces and exclude the possibility of an unexpected attack. [passage omitted]

All European disarmament negotiations must respect the fact that whereas the Warsaw Pact countries build their defense on ground forces, the NATO states build it on naval and air forces. Strictly speaking, the socialist countries have superiority in certain weapons (tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers), and the NATO states have asymmetrically more other weapons (naval forces, air forces, combat helicopters).

NATO demands reducing only tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers in the first stage. Bilateral parity could be achieved in those types of weapons, but there would be even greater danger of Western superiority in naval and air forces. And what some Western experts are offering—that Warsaw Pact, allegedly, “augments” those weapons to the level of NATO—cannot be a solution. This is completely at variance with the disarmament logic, which demands reducing weapons and not producing new ones to replace the scrapped ones, or increasing the number of those which the other side has less of. The NATO countries’ antipathy toward limiting their armed forces is far too obvious in such a position. Also, the contemplations, inspired, in particular, by the United States and Britain, about upgrading short-range nuclear missiles (up to 500 km) are not conducive to the idea of liquidating weapons, but rather smacks of a policy based on a position of strength.

All 35 countries participating in the talks in Vienna bear responsibility for the future of Europe. We want to believe they have come to the negotiating table out of conviction that there is a need to substantially reduce the number of armed forces in Europe, on the adjacent seas, as well as in the air, and that there is a need to create a favorable atmosphere for this by expanding or deepening measures to strengthen confidence. This presupposes political good will, determination to make further progress in Europe, and the willingness to contribute one’s share.

Czechoslovakia, too, has identified itself with this through the speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Johanès, who recalled the initiative aimed at establishing a zone of trust, cooperation, and good neighborly relations along the line of contact between the two military blocs, and the support for the Soviet three-stage plan for reducing conventional armed forces, and also its unilateral reduction of troops and some weapons. In light of these facts, the attempt by some Western states to lecture our republic on how it should organize its domestic affairs is strange. This demonstrates outdated stereotypes, and persistent efforts to divert attention from their lack of willingness to take their own disarmament steps.

The attempts at interference did not meet with corresponding response—most participants from Europe are aware of responsibility for whether life on our continent will be more secure, whether we shall find a way to scrap heaps of weapons. The political introduction of the talks, expressed by the speeches of foreign ministers, gives hope that Europe will find a common language in Vienna, even though the forthcoming weeks and months will not be free from difficulties and obstacles.

Foreign Minister Johanès Interviewed on CFE Talks Opening

*AU1003120589 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
9 Mar 89 p 7*

[Interview with CSSR Foreign Minister Jaromir Johanès by CTK and CSSR journalists accredited to Vienna, in Vienna on 8 March: “The 3-Day Meeting of Foreign Ministers Has Ended; Vienna Reports Overcast, With Possibility of Clearing Up”—quotation marks as published]

[Text] At the close of the meeting of the foreign ministers

of the CSCE participatory states, CSSR Foreign Minister Jaromir Johanès gave an interview to CTK and other Czechoslovak journalists accredited to this forum. He said about it:

“The results of the meeting could be described as positive. We see the exceptional significance of this meeting in the fact that, for the first time in the history of our continent, the foreign ministers of all the European countries, the United States, and Canada met to discuss exclusively the theme of conventional disarmament and the strengthening of trust among states, on the basis of the decision of the Vienna follow-up meeting. It is my opinion that the meeting prepared the ground for the further development of a serious multilateral dialogue on eliminating the high level of military confrontation and mutual suspicion and mistrust.

Predominating in the ministers’ addresses were constructive attempts to seek possibilities for building a common European home under conditions of peace and military detente. The atmosphere of the meeting reflected the spirit of the new political thinking, to the development of which the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are dynamically contributing. All participants confirmed with special emphasis the identical standpoints regarding the need to eliminate the potential to carry out surprise attacks and to wage offensive operations. However, views differed on how to achieve this objective. Clarifying precisely these most simple issues [as published] is the task of the delegations to the Vienna negotiating forums, which will begin their work tomorrow.

We used this meeting to express support for the joint proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries to hold two new rounds of talks, in whose setting-up we took an active part. We also explained our ideas on how to contribute to security in Europe as efficiently as possible by using and implementing the proposal by Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, to establish a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states, a proposal that is directly connected with the subject of the talks now beginning.

As is customary on such occasions, the meeting in Vienna provided an opportunity for bilateral consultations. J. Johanès stated further. I had useful talks with Soviet Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and my other counterparts from the Warsaw Pact member states. I also held talks with Yugoslav Minister Budimir Loncar, new Finnish Minister Pertti Paasio, Greek Minister Karolos Papoulias, French Minister Roland Dumas, and other ministers from the Western European countries. The meeting also provided an opportunity to get acquainted with the new U.S. secretary of state, James Baker. All these contacts were used to exchange views on the most important aspects of the international situation, especially on the orientation of the agenda of the upcoming talks in Vienna, as well as on topical issues concerning the development of bilateral relations. Thus, one can say

that the talks and the stay in Vienna were productive, useful, and yielded several new stimuli for strengthening trust in Europe and deepening mutually advantageous international cooperation."

CSSR Ambassador Balcar Cited on Opening of CSCE, CFE Sessions

Stresses Zones of Confidence
LD1003164489 Prague CTK in English
1506 GMT 10 Mar 89

[Text] Vienna March 10 (CTK correspondent)—The fact that proposals which form a solid basis for further negotiations were presented already at Thursday's [9 March] session of the 35 CSCE signatories was appreciated by Czechoslovak representative Ladislav Balcar here today.

Ladislav Balcar said the two concepts submitted by Canadian representative David Peele and head of the Bulgarian delegation Luben Petrov agree on some points—they do not deny the significance of openness, the role of information and contacts etc. In this context Ladislav Balcar said that the proposal elaborated by the GDR, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia is more comprehensive than that of the West, it makes better use of the scope provided by the mandate of the talks in order that progress may go beyond the results achieved in Stockholm.

Ladislav Balcar said he was convinced that zones of confidence, cooperation and good-neighbourly relations can help strengthen confidence and security in Europe. This is why Czechoslovakia came forward with its initiative to establish such a zone along the borderline between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries. This zone is most sensitive in military relations and therefore requires proper attention, he added.

Addresses CFE Session, Hits NATO Demands
LD1303233989 Prague Television Service in Czech
2114 GMT 13 Mar 89

[Text] Today the 23 states discussing disarmament in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals held a session in Vienna. Ambassador Ladislav Balcar, head of the Czechoslovak delegation, addressed the session:

[Unidentified correspondent] The head of our delegation said that Czechoslovakia is vitally interested in substantially reducing all the most destabilizing military potentials. Some NATO delegations, however, are demanding only a reduction in tanks, artillery, and military transport vehicles. However, tactical combat air forces and [words indistinct] helicopters also belong in the sudden-attack category. These must be included in the reduction package from the very start.

This momentum, said Ladislav Balcar, is especially sensitive for the countries located along the dividing line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO boundaries. Those

who live there rightly demand that certain measures, first and foremost those of a preventive nature which would markedly reduce the possibility of a sudden attack, be adopted along this line.

Further on Continuing Vienna CFE, CSCE Sessions

CSSR's Balcar, USSR's Grinevskiy Interviewed
AU1303152389 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
10 Mar 89 pp 1, 7

[Marek Dobrovolny, Jozef Janto Vienna dispatch: "Finding a Common Language"]

[Excerpts] Vienna (from our special correspondents)—Following the 3-day marathon of speeches by the ministers of foreign affairs, the separate talks by participants in the two follow-up events of the Vienna CSCE meeting began in Vienna's Hofburg Palace on Thursday [9 March]. The Czechoslovak delegation at both forums is headed by Ambassador Ladislav Balcar. [passage omitted]

Prior to the start of the talks, L. Balcar granted an interview to our correspondents. When asked what he considered to be the most important task of the talks now starting, he emphasized that all 35 states participating in the CSCE should find a common language to work out measures that would not be a mere continuation of what was agreed upon in Stockholm, but rather something that would be on a qualitatively higher level. These measures will have to include matters such as limits on military exercises, more detailed information on completed maneuvers, and the like.

Some Western states have taken a reserved attitude toward the Czechoslovak proposal to create a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line of contact between the two military alliances, L. Balcar said.

Several news conferences were also held in the Hofburg. At one of them, O. Grinevskiy, who heads the Soviet delegation, evaluated the opening session of the ministers of foreign affairs. [passage omitted]

Asked by RUDE PRAVO and PRAVDA correspondents which problems might arise during the negotiations, Grinevskiy said:

"NATO claims that it is necessary to reduce the numbers of tanks, artillery systems, and armored personnel carriers. Indeed, these types of arms represent the danger of a surprise attack. But does this apply just to these arms? Let us consider first and foremost the infantry. There has not been any offensive operation in history in which infantry troops did not take part. Or let us consider air forces. The United States itself experienced Japan's surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor, which confronted it with the reality of war. And today we even more have to consider air forces as a vehicle for surprise attacks. We

talk about changing the structure of troops from an offensive to a defensive one, but in NATO's concepts, the implementation of this change is being deferred until the distant future."

Balcar Addresses CFE Session

*AU1603110589 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
14 Mar 89 p 7*

[CTK report: "We Are Interested in Reducing Military Potentials; Head of the Czechoslovak Delegation Speaks at Vienna Negotiations"]

[Text] Vienna—The Monday [13 March] session of the Vienna negotiations of 28 Warsaw Pact and NATO member states on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was addressed by the heads of delegations of the Hungarian People's Republic, Britain, the Socialist Republic of Romania, Spain, the CSSR, and the USSR.

Ambassador Ladislav Balcar, head of the Czechoslovak delegation, termed as promising the framework which is now taking shape in the solution of certain key issues. In our view, it is based on the preparedness of both sides to solve the armament problem—which represents the potential for a sudden attack and for conducting extensive offensive operations—and on the declared effort to reduce and limit conventional armed forces to an equal collective level. As we see it, it is also based on the bilateral tendency to evade disputes over the numerical strength of conventional armed forces and arms, which lead nowhere.

He then stated that, in view of its geographical position, Czechoslovakia is vitally interested in a substantial reduction of all the most destabilizing military potentials. In this context he pointed out that certain NATO delegations are coming to the talks with a unilateral, narrow understanding of this extensive set of problems, one viewed solely from reducing and limiting tanks, artillery, and armored personnel vehicles. However, that represents only a partial solution.

Balcar stressed that the typical instruments of a surprise attack include, inter alia, tactical front air forces and combat helicopters, which must be included in the entire reduction package from the very start—in other words, as does the proposal submitted by the Warsaw Pact member states. He concluded by saying that this factor is a particularly sensitive one for countries situated along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO member states. "In view of Czechoslovakia's geographical location, we are deeply interested in strengthening stability and security in this area in particular. I want to stress that the people living here know best that this goal can only be reached through increased efforts. That is why we see nothing wrong with the idea of adopting certain measures along this line, especially preventive measures that would strikingly reduce the possibility of a surprise attack."

Arms Plant Seeks Alternatives to Military Production in Face of Cuts

AU1403132889

[Editorial Report] Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 10 March on page 3 carries a 1,200-word article by Miroslav Zeman, RUDE PRAVO staff journalist, and Anton Jezik, editor of PREDSTIH ["LEAD," the enterprise newspaper of the Dubnica nad Vahom Heavy Engineering Works (ZTS)], entitled "The Tough School of Independence." The article deals with efforts of the Dubnica factory to find alternative production programs for the scaled-down production of military equipment. The article opens by saying that last year the rumor began to spread in the Vah valley that the Dubnica factory would "fire people" because "it has no work for 4,000 people."

It then quotes Engineer Anton Brunai, chairman of the socialist self-management council of the ZTS Martin combine (of which the Dubnica plant forms part), as saying: "We have never considered laying off people. Even though we have come up against big problems, we knew that we must put the potentials residing in our employees to use. The main difficulties have been rooted in the fact that the reduction of the key production program (as a result of the positive changes in international relations and the Warsaw Pact countries' disarmament initiatives) has affected even highly specialized experts assigned to the highest wage scale categories but narrowly specialized on some highly demanding operations."

Zeman and Jezik go on to say that there will not be any lay-offs, "with the exception of a few loafers no one here will miss," and that only 180 employees, mostly young people, will have to undergo retraining. This, they say, "will be made possible by the proposed expansion of existing future-oriented production programs and by the development of new production branches that conform at least partly with the production base and with people's qualifications." In the remaining part of the article, they discuss various production programs planned or considered by the Dubnica managers. These include the expanded production of high lift trucks, the production of agricultural transporters and handling equipment, small excavators for the building industry, snowmobiles, hydraulic equipment, single-purpose machine tools, as well as processing and packaging lines for the food industry.

Although the authors are optimistic about the future of the Dubnica factory, they concede that the change in the production structure will have an impact on the economic situation of the enterprise. This is because "a considerable part of materials and intermediary products earmarked for the original production have not found a use and remain in the warehouses" and because under long-term economic contracts the enterprise continues to receive "supplies which it will not need." This is said to increase the level of inventories and to aggravate the insolvency of the ZTS Martin combine. Another source of difficulty, according to the RUDE PRAVO

article, is that, because the production program is still unclear, "it was not possible to draw up an annual plan and only quarterly plans are being drawn up."

General Vaclavik Addresses Youth Unionists on Troop Cuts, Army Service

*LD1503105689 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1730 GMT 14 Mar 89*

[Text] The command of the Czechoslovak People's Army, headed by Army General Milan Vaclavik, held talks in Prague today with the leadership of the Central Committee of the Social Youth Union. Stanislav Benda reports:

[Benda] Comrade Vasil Mohorita highly praised the meeting of the members of the Socialist Youth Union with the representatives of our Army. He said that the young generation has a high level of interest in our Armed Forces, especially with regard to the disarmament steps taken by individual countries of the Warsaw Pact, including Czechoslovakia. He said that young people support the adopted measures and most of them are aware that the Army must secure the defense of our country. He also discussed the wishes and comments of young people, for example that the fathers of families who are conscripts in the Army would be able to meet their families more often, or that they could serve in the Army, in their home localities.

Comrade Milan Vaclavik told the Social Youth Union members that so far, NATO has not joined the disarmament initiatives of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, we cannot yet plan to shorten the length of military service or make other concessions. With regard to time off for soldiers, he quoted Order 13 which prescribes exactly the length of time allowed off: 2 1/2 hours on weekdays, 7 hours on Saturday, and 10 hours on Sunday. He also discussed one of the demands of the Socialist Youth Union members: the possibility for soldiers with serious family or social ties to be placed in their own localities. An order to this effect from the chief of the General Staff has already been valid since 1 January this year. With regard to prolonging vacations for soldiers, it seems that they have not been well informed, as rules and provisions enable the commanders of military units to prolong vacations by 5 days depending on the precise nature of the service, to grant a special vacation to 7 days, or to grant an unpaid vacation, during which no financial requirements can be made of between 1 and 4 weeks.

The comrade minister emphasized that they are ready to tackle problems burdening young soldiers in carrying out their duties.

At the end of the meeting with the members of the Central Committee of the Social Youth Union, I asked Comrade Milan Vaclavik for a short assessment of the meeting:

[Begin Vaclavik recording] I think that this meeting was very useful and beneficial for both sides. We each explained our attitudes and discussed further steps which must be taken to tackle the problems of young people in the Army, and also other young people. We also discussed means of influencing public opinion, how to work with young people, and which new elements should be introduced into the administrative work of primary organizations and of commanders in implementing the resolutions of the Socialist Youth Union Congress and those measures which were worked out on the basis of Congress' resolutions for the Czechoslovak People's Army. Comrades spoke openly and critically and we each voiced our views. We shall assess the results and after some time we shall meet again to evaluate the progress we are making in our work with young people. [end recording]

CD Representative Vajnar Cited on CW Ban Verification Experiment

*LD1603142389 Prague CTK in English
1356 GMT 16 Mar 89*

[Text] Geneva March 16 (CTK)—Head of a Czechoslovak delegation to a plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament Vratislav Vajnar spoke here today about the results of an experiment aimed to verify whether chemical weapons are produced in the civilian chemical industry.

He generalized some of the results of the experiment, and said that control of the civilian chemical industry based on principles which are going to be included in a prepared convention on a general and complete ban on chemical weapons and their elimination, is possible and reliable.

The Czechoslovak representative concluded that, according to the government's statement from January 5 this year, Czechoslovakia is ready to provide information on laboratories, enterprises and other facilities which work with chemicals and which might apply to the convention.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

NATO Strategic Concepts Assailed in Connection with CFE Talks Opening

Woerner, Scholz Comments on Deterrence Hit
*AU1003132589 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 9 Mar 89 p 2*

["He." commentary: "Dissonance Surrounding Vienna Talks"]

[Text] Precisely on Monday [6 March] this week, when the foreign ministers' meeting of the 35 CSCE states opened in Vienna, which launched talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe, as well as on

further confidence- and security-building measures, precisely on this day officials and military officials who are opposed to detente—and for whom disarmament is a specter—made efforts to obstruct the process that has been initiated.

NATO Secretary General Woerner published an article in the WALL STREET JOURNAL claiming that NATO lacks a disarmament concept. Instead of this he proposes: "In my view, NATO does not need a new structure." "NATO's determination in the issue of military deterrence" has proved itself, he stresses. That means we are back to the doctrine of deterrence which is based on the hackneyed lie about the threat, and which is a truly aggressive doctrine that provides for a first nuclear strike.

Completely ignoring the start of the Vienna talks and the unilateral disarmament measures of the Warsaw Pact states, Defense Minister Scholz also resorts to the lie about the threat. In an article published by SÜD-DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG he stated that one still has to proceed "from the superpower Soviet Union's claim to hegemony and consequently its excessive, primarily conventional military superiority in Europe."

Springer's DIE WELT published statements by "defense expert" Ruehl, who shamelessly distorts facts: "Even after reaching an agreement, as desired by the West"—to put it correctly one would have to say as desired by East and West in the spirit of eliminating disparities, of further reducing the lower ceilings, and of structural incapability to attack—"the Soviet Union would continue to be by far the greatest military power in Europe." The West should bear this in mind during future talks, Ruehl suggests. This means continuing the arms race instead of disarmament, in both the conventional and nuclear spheres.

By resorting to old thought patterns, NATO officials extend their skepticism and dissonance to the negotiations in Vienna. It is true that we, too, do not believe that the negotiations will proceed without friction and that results will be achieved quickly. However, our attitude is different. The GDR foreign minister mentioned the preconditions for finding acceptable and viable answers to the question of conventional disarmament: "The starting conditions are good. The socialist states have done their share. Now the other side is requested to show something similar because, in the end, effective disarmament can only be realized if both sides want it and carry it out."

Gen Galvin's Letter on FOFA Condemned

AU0603125089 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 3 Mar 89 p 2

["r.e." commentary: "What Does Galvin Want With FOFA?"]

[Text] Prior to the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces, security- and confidence-building measures, the West is advocating FOFA (Follow-On Forces Attack).

What is FOFA? Let us consult an expert for the explanation of the term, namely U.S. General Galvin, NATO commander-in-chief in Europe. He published a letter in the latest edition of EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE [European Defense Studies] with the pithy title "Eye, Mind, and Fist for FOFA."

General Galvin praises FOFA as a strategic concept, on the basis of which "all the West's military capabilities will be improved by stressing the third dimension in combat." "The first sphere are the target acquisition systems," the general explains. "They are the eyes with which NATO can detect the enemy's movements in depth. Within the second sphere, an 'information gathering center'—the mind of the enterprise—determines the target for the setting of priorities by the leadership and quickly passes on the corresponding information to the third sphere of the weapons system—the 'fist'." As examples of systems with FOFA capability, Galvin mentions modern aircraft, improved ammunition, and multiple rocket systems, as have already been introduced or are intended to be introduced shortly by NATO.

Galvin emphasizes that NATO needs FOFA because "the Warsaw Pact's attack options remain unchanged." Of course, the general knows the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, and is therefore aware that this simply is not true. However, he needs the lie about a threat to conceal the fact that FOFA is a NATO concept for attacking socialist countries.

Conventional disarmament and confidence-building will be discussed in Vienna. The situation is really paradoxical: The Warsaw Pact has initiated unilateral disarmament, and NATO is beginning unilateral armament and increasing the threat to the Warsaw Pact states.

In addition to that, it is clear that such a situation cannot continue to exist forever. To bring about a change for the better through a radical reduction of military confrontation in Europe, in the interest of security and of everybody, will be the task of the Vienna talks. In the interest of peaceful coexistence, all peoples on our continent will see to it that the negotiations yield the desired results, and that they are conducted in a constructive manner—by both sides.

NATO 'Double-Dealing' in CFE Talks Assailed
AU1403173889 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 13 Mar 89 p 2

["He." Editorial: "The Chance of Vienna"]

[Text] On Thursday [9 March] the negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments and on the creation of a new generation of confidence- and security-building measures in Europe started in Vienna.

Regardless of certain nuances, the majority of the Western papers also speak of the chance that the negotiations between the member states of the Warsaw Pact and of NATO might achieve the elimination of asymmetries, the further reduction of the then reached equal thresholds, and finally the non-attack capability, and a stable peace on our old continent.

Of course, this chance will not become reality by doing nothing. Constructive work is needed. This is the yardstick for the concepts which were presented by both sides in Vienna. The socialist states proposed a three-stage plan, which corresponds to what the peoples in East and West hope for and which is justifiably called the chance of Vienna. In summary: The existing imbalances are to be eliminated between 1991-94 and the number of troops as well as their entire offensive armament is to be reduced by 10 to 15 percent below the level of that side which is already at the lowest level. From 1994-97 reduction by another 25 percent. From 1997-2000 establishment of exclusively defensive structures.

Unfortunately, one cannot say that the NATO concept is equally precise and equally realistic. NATO only looks at three categories of weapons: tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. Why not troop strength, which is something that has been lamented by the Atlantic alliance for a long time under the motto of the "Threat by an overwhelming superiority of the East"? Why not attack planes (concerning which NATO is superior)? Why not combat helicopters, which are among the most important attack weapons and concerning which the West is also superior?

One must also not overlook the fact that while the Vienna negotiations were starting, NATO Secretary General Woerner again strongly voiced his support for the "irreplaceability of the doctrine of deterrence," for the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons, for the "necessity" of new types of weapons....

The people in the West, who have long ceased believing in the lie of the threat and are fed up with the continuing course of arms buildup, will—like ourselves—observe the negotiating table very closely. Talking about disarmament there but in reality striving for unilateral advantages and revving up the armament machinery far away from the Danube—this double-dealing endangers the chance that has opened up in Vienna.

Baker Announcement on Possible Early CW Withdrawal from FRG Derided

AU0903112689 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 8 Mar 89 p 2

["Television commentary" by Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler: "Master of Manipulation"]

[Text] On the wonderful blue Danube, the new U.S. secretary of state has allegedly made a surprise proposal: The United States wants to withdraw its chemical weapons from the FRG very shortly. This is what Western media have been reporting since the alleged announcement was made.

Unfortunately, this good news is belied by the fact that Mr Baker never made this specific announcement. He stated that he was pleased "to be able to make the announcement that President Bush is currently examining whether..."!

The "announcement of an examination" of the sensational contribution to worldwide disarmament... Also, Mr Baker did not forget to refurbish an old hat, calling for the "elimination of the Wall." The only thing that was missing was the proclamation: "I am a Wiener."

The list of things that the electronic media in the free, democratic, and pluralistic West chose not to report is much longer. For one thing, the United States—probably—wants to eliminate poison shells from the FRG which are so old and rusty and destroyed by corrosion that they threaten to poison the environment. Instead of those shells, modern and efficient new missiles are to be deployed—binary weapons of mass destruction, if necessary. In addition to that, the media's love of truth did not go as far as reporting on the speech by the first speaker in Vienna, GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, who stated: "It remains of utmost urgency to banish chemical weapons from military arsenals...and to conclude a convention on the banning of chemical weapons." The GDR foreign minister's speech was not mentioned by the media at all. They did not report either that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze explicitly approved Oskar Fischer's speech.

The media did not contain a single word about the article by the same foreign minister, which was published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 10 January and which stated that the GDR does not possess chemical weapons, that it does not intend to develop such weapons, and that other states have not deployed a single chemical weapon on our territory.

There was no mention of the joint proposal of the GDR and CSSR and a similar proposal submitted by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany to create a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe.

The masters of manipulation also failed to notice that the proposal for a worldwide ban on chemical weapons and the setting up of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe has been on the desk of the chancellor in Bonn since the beginning of 1987. Nor did they consider it worth reporting that Erich Honecker reiterated this proposal during his talks with Kohl in September 1987.

All these things are being ignored by the FRG's electronic media. What is given broad attention are reports about the U.S. withdrawal and calls on the Soviet Union to eliminate its chemical weapons in the GDR as well. Against his better judgement, Chancellor Kohl joins in the chorus.

This is really a masterpiece of manipulation, which confirms the necessity of efforts to "uncover and expose intellectual aggression," as Foreign Minister Fischer put it in his speech.

Ten U.S. INF Inspectors Arrive To Inspect Former Missile Bases

LD1303175189 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1711 GMT 13 Mar 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—A group of U.S. inspectors Monday arrived in the GDR. The 10 inspectors arrived in the morning at Leipzig-Schkeuditz Airport, where they were received by representatives of the GDR National Defense Ministry and the Soviet Army. In 1988, the United States was able to verify that intermediate- and short-range missiles had been withdrawn ahead of schedule and completely from the six former GDR deployment sites. Now, in line with the INF treaty, there can be routine inspections of these liquidated missile bases for another 12 years. In accordance with the INF treaty agreement on inspections among the GDR, the USSR, and the CSSR, the GDR is fulfilling its obligation to support the United States in its inspections on GDR territory.

HUNGARY

Foreign Minister Varkonyi Speaks at Vienna CFE/CSBM Talks

LD0603194189 Budapest MTI in English 1738 GMT 6 Mar 89

[Text] Vienna, March 6 (MTI)—Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi addressed the Monday [6 March] opening of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and confidence and security-building measures in Europe.

Mr Varkonyi pointed out, "Hungary attaches particular importance to the European process of security and cooperation. At the present opening of two negotiating forums explicitly concerned with military security, we also find it necessary and timely to stress that we regard the European security and cooperation process as an integral whole covering economic cooperation, the development of cultural relations, and the enforcement of human rights. Naturally, this time attention is focussed on issues of military security that are essential for the future of Europe and indispensable for making agreements reached in Vienna irreversible.

"The Hungarian Government has repeatedly expressed its intention to participate in carrying out the disarmament measures from the beginning. I would like to confirm our interest in early success of the talks, which will allow for further substantial cuts in Hungarian and Hungarian-based armed forces. We are interested in and want to actively contribute to working out a new group of confidence-building measures.

"We are convinced that the best foundation for attaining results would be to reach agreement on the major data of the armed forces currently stationed in Europe. For this reason, we would like the working out of categories to serve as a basis for the mutual exchange of armed forces data and, if need be, their subsequent verification, to be the starting point of the talks, and possibly discussed by a special working group."

Mr Varkonyi said, "The collation of categories and preliminary data exchange should not hinder the working out of substantive measures.

"We think that comparing the capabilities of the confronting armed forces will become indispensable during the talks. Such a comparison is impossible without a precise knowledge of power relations, which includes several quality factors besides numerical strength.

"In our view, the joint reductions and the attainment of the upper levels will become viable within a short time. This should fit into the process, the ultimate aim of which would be to create the structural incapability of attack of the European armed forces. The current negotiations are also to work out mutually acceptable criteria and gradually accomplishable measures along this line.

"We interpret structural incapability of attack as the maintenance of forces which are unsuitable for large-scale offensive operations but sufficient for the effective defence of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the given country in all predictable cases.

"Considerably lowering the level of armed forces, however, is only the first step in this direction. We have to go further and abolish the attack capability.

"Structural incapability of attack should be expressed in the military doctrine of armed forces, which also implies the elimination of the established enemy images present not only in the ideologies, but also in the training schedule of the armies. We stand prepared for this.

"Attainment of these goals may be largely promoted by the confidence-building measures. Therefore, the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic ascribes outstanding importance to the continued development of the Stockholm measures and the drafting of further confidence-building measures.

"Hungary participated in working out the Budapest manifesto of the foreign ministerial committee of the Warsaw Treaty in October 1988 which—besides improving the Stockholm stipulations—offered a wide variety of possible measures to its partners in NATO, and to the neutral and non-aligned countries. We remain open to the proposals and concepts of other states.

"From the Hungarian part we consider working out the measures aimed at restricting military activities, in which the stipulations of the Stockholm document can

be considered as a modest initial stage, to be an important task. Maintaining the current intensity and degree of military activities is unjustifiable in the light of the unilateral and negotiated reduction of the confronting forces. The aim of the restrictions is to limit the degree and frequency of the large-scale military exercises, including alarm exercises, on the level necessary to maintain the appropriate level of training.

"We hold it similarly important to extend the reporting-observation measures to the air force. We support extending a confidence-building system to such naval activities which have effects on European security.

"Hungary is particularly interested in working out such new steps that can promote expanding the limits of the current confidence-building system, and which explore new perspectives by utilizing further opportunities inherent in the confidence-building measures. These solutions could include, for instance, setting up the European risk-reduction centre, and the development of communication, consultation and contacts in general.

"A paradox situation has come about amidst the current conditions of the development of East-West relations and the progress of the all-European process: Contrary to the politicians, the military leaders and decision-makers maintain only sporadic relations with their partners. One of the recommendations of the Helsinki Final Act had already recognized the importance of military contacts. We believe that the developing contacts, exchanging military delegations are important means and areas of confidence building and intensifying mutual understanding.

"By launching the activity of the two parallel negotiation forums, the participating states are entering a major venture of unparalleled importance both with respect to the shaping of international relations and the fate of Europe. The structures of European military confrontation came about in the period of the cold war. The development of conventional forces continued in an unlimited manner in the past decades. This is increasingly contradictory to the joint interests that are linked to the intensification of East-West relations based on cooperation, which call for the gradual dismantling of confrontation, the creation of armed forces with mutually satisfactory sizes and defence structures, and the creation of a new quality of openness and confidence," stressed Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi.

Delegation Head Sees Hungary Benefitting from CFE, CSBM Accords

*LD1603094489 Budapest MTI in English
0732 GMT 16 Mar 89*

[Text] Vienna, March 16 (MTI)—Hungary would benefit from a general agreement, expected from the latest talks in Vienna, via the expansion of the confidence building measures passed by the Stockholm conference and proved successful in practice, as well as through further measures, said Ambassador David Meiszter,

head of the Hungarian delegation, at the Wednesday [15 March] plenary session of the conference on confidence and security building convened by the 35 states of the Helsinki process last week.

As pointed out by the Hungarian diplomat, this potential agreement of the "thirty-fives"—together with the two military blocks' control of conventional arms—would help eliminate the elements of suspicion and hostility in the East-West security matters, replacing them with a new partnership based on mutual security. Then, the ambassador proceeded to analyze the general proposal put forward by the socialist countries, including Hungary. He stresses that apart from the limitation of major military exercises and measures affecting the air force, the Hungarian delegation is ready to make a stand for the development of interstate and human relations, at a time when the military contacts between the CMEA and NATO member states, as well as the neutral states, have become crucial elements of the confidence building process.

POLAND

Foreign Minister Olechowski's Statement on Return from Vienna CFE Opening

*AU1303165189 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
9 Mar 89 p 2*

[Statement by Foreign Minister Tadeusz Olechowski on his return from the Vienna CSCE foreign ministers conference, Warsaw Airport, 8 March]

[Text] PAP—Foreign Minister Tadeusz Olechowski issued the following statement to PAP:

I am returning from Vienna, where the foreign ministers of European and North American countries held talks over the last 3 days. Together, we have initiated a new mechanism of disarmament dialogue in Europe, which is significant for European security and stabilization. This dialogue consists of two negotiating tables, namely, talks by the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO countries on conventional armed forces reductions, and talks by the 35 CSCE states on the subject of confidence-building measures.

The ministerial debate affirmed that the negotiations should be surrounded by a favorable climate. This was made plain by the businesslike and nonconfrontational tone of the speeches and the attempts to find points of contact and even, as Minister Shevardnadze put it, "construct bridges."

The speeches contained the outlines of future disarmament standpoints. The East and the West presented various programs to reduce armed forces and consolidate security. There are major differences between the two sides, but not so many that a consensus is impossible. For example, we noted with satisfaction that our ideas, contained in the Jaruzelski Plan, to reduce the

capability for surprise attacks and remove the most dangerous and destructive weapons from the middle of the continent were generally accepted.

The Polish-FRG idea of a June 1989 representative seminar of diplomats, politicians, scientists, and military men on the subject of military doctrines and endowing them with an unequivocally defensive character met with interest.

All in all, we have made a good start. We have provided the negotiations with political impulses. We are concerned that they succeed and quickly lead to the first accords. These negotiations should not be bogged down in technical details. If necessary, we should meet more often and at a higher level, in order to speed up these negotiations.

Taking active part in establishing a joint plane of disarmament for our alliance, Poland will present the military and political thinking contained in the Jaruzelski Plan. We will see to it that the military specifics of Eastern Europe are taken into consideration, and that disarmament undertakings are applied to entire alliances and to each of their members.

The international conferences are an excellent opportunity to talk to our partners and resolve many valid issues of major bilateral and multilateral importance. In Vienna I met with the foreign ministers of Austria, Finland, Spain, the FRG, and United States, apart from which I had chance encounters with other colleagues.

I discussed the future of the CSCE and disarmament with all those people with whom I spoke.

We agreed that these processes are having a positive bearing on the international situation, and are serving to increase confidence and cooperation in Europe and overcome the barriers that divide the continent. However, the chief purpose of these meetings was to review bilateral relations and establish the paths for their future development. All those with whom I spoke showed a keen interest in the changes in Poland, especially the "roundtable."

They welcomed our reforms and our efforts to overcome the crisis. They said that all this activity possesses an international dimension. I told them that we are not seeking acclaim and recognition, but we do expect our partners to be committed to energetic economic, financial, and scientific cooperation with Poland. Only this kind of attitude can improve our export possibilities and our ability to repay our debts, which our creditors should find interesting. The West's stance toward this very issue has become a measure of the credibility of its assurances of support for our country.

ROMANIA

Foreign Minister Totu Addresses CFE/CSBM Talks in Vienna

AU1003135089 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian
8 Mar 89 p 6

["Romania's and President Nicolae Ceausescu's Considerations and Proposals on Issues of Disarmament and Strengthening Confidence and Security on the European Continent, Presented by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Vienna Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the European States and of the United States and Canada," on 7 March]

[Text] Taking the floor at the Vienna meeting of foreign ministers of the European states, and of the United States and Canada, a meeting marking the start of negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe and the endorsement of new confidence- and security-building measures on the continent, Romanian Foreign Minister Ioan Totu said:

Mr Chairman, esteemed representatives: The opening of the two forums of negotiations—on conventional armed forces in Europe and on adopting new measures for confidence-building and security, respectively—marks an event of major importance in the activity of our continent.

Within this framework, I have the honor to present the consideration and proposals of Romania and of the president of the SR of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, on issues of disarmament, confidence-building, and security on the European Continent.

Romania believes that an open and sincere approach to the problem of the tremendous concentration of forces and weapons on the continent and to the serious threat posed by this to the peace and quiet of the European peoples has been an objective requirement for a long time.

At this point, when lengthy discussions are being held on opening new prospects for disarmament, we believe that efforts in this direction must depend on facts. Although positive steps have been taken of late, the arms race still continues, particularly in new forms such as the modernization and improvement of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons. Therefore the cardinal issue of the world and the European Continent continues to be halting the arms race and moving to effective disarmament, a type that will incorporate all types of weapons. In the opinion of Romania and President Nicolae Ceausescu, only in this way will we be able to ensure the most stable balance of international forces at the lowest possible level, as well as equal security for all states, and only thus will we be able to avoid the situation in which one or another weapon may be used for blackmailing or pressuring certain states.

In this sense, at the recent Paris conference and at the Geneva conference for disarmament, Romania proposed that the problems of eliminating mass-destruction weapons—nuclear, chemical, and other weapons—should not be discussed separately, but rather jointly and closely linked to eschew a concentration of military power in some centers that would dominate the world.

As far as conventional weapons are concerned, Romania ranked among the first states that stressed that measures are needed to eliminate nuclear, chemical, and other mass-destruction weapons, measures that should be coupled with substantial cuts in conventional weapons, troops, and military spending. Thus, in greeting the proposals on achieving nuclear disarmament by the end of the century, President Nicolae Ceausescu emphasized: "We also believe that it is necessary to formulate a comprehensive general disarmament program, one that should focus on nuclear disarmament but that should also incorporate all so-called conventional weapons, especially because some of them are very close to nuclear weapons in terms of their destructive potential."

Romania has held and continues to hold that words should be followed by deeds, and that states should adopt unilateral measures aimed at reducing armed forces, weapons, and military spending to contribute to greater confidence and security.

As is known, in November 1986, on the basis of a national referendum, Romania was the first country to adopt a unilateral 5-10 percent cut in its conventional weapons, troops, and military spending, expressing the hope that this move would set an example for other countries to follow. Part of the equipment affected by this cut was transferred to the economy to be used for peaceful purposes. The recent measures adopted in this sense by other Warsaw Pact member states mark new steps on the road to disarmament.

As far as the framework of the negotiations is concerned, Romania as early as December 1982 proposed the start of direct negotiations between the states of the two military alliances, proceeding from the fact that they are responsible for the military situation on the European Continent.

Mr Chairman, recalling these stands and acts, I would like to emphasize that Romania has always promoted and consistently promotes—under all circumstances—a principled policy concerning all international issues, in accordance with the basic interests of the Romanian people, of peace, understanding, and international cooperation.

We will not depart from this policy. Therefore, we welcomed the developments that made the start of the current negotiations possible.

We believe that the proposals and actions of the Warsaw Pact member states, initiated in connection with the subject of these negotiations, demonstrate the desire and determination of these countries to substantially reduce conventional weapons and military spending. The NATO countries have also made proposals that may contribute to a realistic and constructive approach to the issues of conventional disarmament.

1. In connection with the negotiations on armed forces and conventional weapons, Romania believes that action is necessary to ensure a military balance at the lowest level of armament, so that a situation will be created in Europe in which its states possess only the minimum needed armed forces and weapons for defense.

As for the specific ways and means to achieve this goal, Romania suggests the following:

—The two military alliances should move to reduce weapons and military troops so that by the year 2000 these should amount to 50 percent of the current level. These cuts should be applied to the whole area under discussion at these negotiations and not only to certain geographical zones.

In the first stage, the cuts in weapons and military troops should amount to 25-30 percent. Within this framework, taking account of the quantitative and qualitative aspect of troops, weapons, and military equipment, as well as of other geographical and strategic aspects, existing imbalances and asymmetries should be eliminated and made balanced, and approximately equal ceilings should be agreed upon.

We believe that cuts should not be made automatically for all countries, but rather proportionally and in keeping with their degree of armament. The states with greater military potentials should carry out a higher percentage of cuts.

The troops to be reduced should be demobilized, while weapons should be destroyed or transferred to other areas to be used for various peaceful purposes. Reductions should take place under an effective control over both the measures for reductions and the pledges concerning the armed forces and weapons left after the cuts.

—The cuts in weapons and military troops should be coupled by those in military spending—50 percent by the year 2000, of which 25-30 percent should be achieved in the first stage.

On the basis of unilateral pledges, the participating states should assume the obligation not to use the financial resources made available in this way for other military purposes. In this sense, they should voluntarily specify the socioeconomic areas into which they will channel these funds, while in a subsequent stage cuts in military spending should be included in specific agreements, making them the subject of verification measures.

- Limits should be set for the total number of troops and weapons a state can deploy outside its national territory.
- The accords to be negotiated should include limited ceilings for each alliance and each state separately, particularly for the states with greater military potentials or for those situated at the line of contact between the two alliance systems.

In case the distribution of cuts is made between the states belonging to a military alliance, criteria should be established according to which limited ceilings should be set for countries within the given alliance. These should take account of the qualitative factor of weapons and troops, the size of the territory to be defended, and of the geostrategic position.

- Attention should primarily be paid to reducing weapons with high offensive potentials such as tanks, large-scale artillery, armored cars, and certain types of military aircraft, as well as to landing forces, airborne troops, and to amphibious assault units.
- At the same time, along with measures to reduce weapons, troops, and military spending, the production of weapons should also be reduced, while certain military enterprises should be converted to production for peaceful purposes.
- Given the complexity of the task of defining a most realistic balance of forces and establishing a balance according to categories of weapons—in order to give an impetus to the negotiations—the states must resort to unilateral (not negotiated) measures, which should apply to both armed forces and weapons that are the subject of negotiations, and to other military forces that are not the subject of negotiations but which are important in the overall calculation of the balance of forces. Such measures may take the form of reductions, relocations, transfers, and so forth.

2. In connection with the negotiations on adopting new confidence- and security-building measures, Romania starts from the results achieved at the Stockholm conference.

We believe that the provisions of the document issued by the Stockholm conference are a solid foundation for achieving the goals of the new negotiations. At the same time, we note that the measures adopted in Stockholm have not brought about a lesser intensity and scope of military activities on the continent, nor have they reduced the potential for launching an armed attack.

In Romania's opinion, the "negotiations of the 35" have to mark a new stage by moving from just stating the aim of achieving greater confidence and foresight to actually limiting conditions that could allow surprise attacks or wide-scale offensive actions to be launched.

In this sense, we propose the following:

- That the new generation of confidence- and security-building measures should cover a decrease in the intensity and scope of military actions; the renunciation of certain activities that could generate mistrust and tension; the limitation of possible wide-scale offensive operations; and the establishment of measures to prevent nuclear accidents.

At the same time, given the organic integration between various categories of weapons, the new generation of confidence- and security-building measures should also cover the activities of naval and military air forces, which are the subject of negotiations.

- During the negotiations, measures should be agreed upon in connection with: the establishment of security zones and corridors along the borders between states and on the line of contact between the two military blocs; the limitation and reduction of military activities to the established levels; the prevention of increased tension by prohibiting the redeployment of new troops and the development and deployment of new bases on the territory of other states; and the limitation of transferring troops and weapons from outside to the zones where these measures apply.
- Of great importance for building confidence and security is the adoption of measures on: freezing military spending at the current level and starting negotiations on their subsequent reduction; creating areas of peace, cooperation, and good-neighborliness free from nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans, central and northern Europe, and in other areas.
- Romania also proposed prohibiting maneuvers and movements involving ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons in the vicinity of the land and maritime borders of other states; and refraining from organizing military activities in the vicinity of peaceful nuclear facilities, primarily near nuclear power plants.

- Steps must be taken to enhance communication and cooperation between states to contribute to building confidence in such areas as: the exchange of military information, the notification of military activities and the acceptance of observers, and the development of European contacts, consultations, and communication systems on security issues.

Mr Chairman, in presenting these considerations and proposals on conventional disarmament, Romania emphasizes the need for negotiations concerning this field to be completely in accordance with the broader goal of general and total disarmament, the core of which is nuclear disarmament.

In this sense, we believe that it is necessary to renounce the concept of defense on the basis of so-called "nuclear deterrence." The achievement of general and total disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament, must come from the concept of ensuring the minimum needed capabilities for defense. This calls for renouncing the production of nuclear and chemical weapons, and any other weapons of mass destruction.

It is necessary to adopt measures to halt the modernization and improvement of nuclear weaponry and for renouncing the deployment of new nuclear weapons on the European Continent. Therefore, Romania proposes that, along with negotiations on conventional disarmament, efforts should be made to free the European Continent from nuclear weapons, so that the European peoples are spared the dangers of a devastating war.

For this purpose, Romania proposes the setting up of a special negotiating forum on questions concerning nuclear weapons in Europe.

Mr Chairman, Romania has always held that major international issues, particularly those concerning peace and security, are of direct concern to all states, which should, consequently, have the opportunity to participate directly in examining and resolving them.

The fact that in this stage negotiations on conventional armed forces are taking place only among the 23 states belonging to the military alliances should not at all affect this principle.

We believe that the major goal of the negotiations and measures that will be agreed on should aim to create conditions permitting the simultaneous dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

We also want to make it completely clear that, in Romania's opinion, the "negotiations of the 23" are not negotiations between two military blocs but rather negotiations among 23 independent and sovereign states on the basis of full equality. They are taking place within the CSCE and will have to be governed by its principles and procedural rules. We view this as only a temporary arrangement, and we hope that the neutral and non-aligned states will have the option of later entering the negotiations, so that the negotiations on conventional disarmament will be held within the natural framework of all 35 states participating in the CSCE process.

In problems of peace and disarmament, as in fact in all problems of today, Europe can fulfill its mission only as a Europe united in its diversity of social systems, philosophical and political concepts, and as a Europe of free and independent nations, which should work for peace, disarmament, and understanding, and for cooperation and socioeconomic progress.

Mr Chairman, the opening of the two forums of negotiations is one of the tangible and positive results of the Vienna meeting. This was possible because of the constructive and sustained cooperation among all the signatories to the Final Act and by taking account of the legitimate interests and stands of all states on the basis of mutual respect. The responsible way in which the negotiations on defining the mandate of the two newly created forums have taken place is auspicious for the coming negotiations.

We believe that all preconditions exist, so that the negotiations we have begun will yield the results expected by the European peoples. Recently, the head of the Romanian state, Nicolae Ceausescu, emphasized: "Romania will continue to actively participate in efforts for disarmament, security, and peace, and will constantly develop cooperation with all states in the world, with democratic forces everywhere, and with all peoples in the struggle for a new policy, disarmament, and peace."

In conclusion, I want to express warm thanks to the Austrian Government for the hospitality we enjoyed during this opening meeting and for the conditions created for holding future negotiations.

Commentary Stresses Link Between CFE, CSBM Talks in Vienna

*AU1403201089 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1855 GMT 14 Mar 89*

["For the Attainment of the Major Goal of Vienna Negotiations—Guaranteed Security to Each State"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 14/03/1989—The concomitant holding of debates by the two important negotiating fora in Austria's capital city—on conventional armed forces and on further confidence- and security-building measures in Europe—highlights the close connection between conventional disarmament and the consolidation of confidence on the continent.

The fact that states members of opposed military alliances are gathered for the first time at the table of negotiations on conventional armed forces illustrates the significance of ensuring greater military stability and a balance of forces at an ever lower level. The reduction of conventional weapons, of the armed forces and military spending is an imperative demand for Europe, a continent supersaturated from a military point of view both as regards fighting technique and the troops stationed. On the other hand, the sums earmarked for the maintenance and improvement of fighting means and conventional armed forces hold the greatest share in military spending as a whole.

Another consideration, and not the least one, regarding the highly opportune character of the Vienna negotiations is linked to the highly dangerous degree of conventional weapons following their steady improvement.

Just like other aspects of disarmament, the success of the current negotiations will depend on the way in which the negotiators approach the questions, given the realities, and on their political will to reach such accords as to meet the security interests of each party, of all the peoples on the continent. Practically speaking, each participating state can contribute to the success of negotiations provided that each one fully observes the other states' sovereignty and independence, their interests in security, and takes into account their proposals and points of view. President Nicolae Ceausescu underlined the need that all states, regardless of size or social system, especially the small and medium-sized countries, the developing and non-aligned countries that are directly interested in a policy of collaboration, independence and peace, should actively participate in the resolution of the complex problems of our days. In these conditions, the conventional disarmament negotiations can have a positive impact on the demarches in other spheres of the international life, given the important role the European continent plays in influencing the course of the international life.

The beginning of conventional disarmament negotiations confirms the conception of Romania which, inspired by a high sense of responsibility for the destiny of mankind, declares for a concomitant liquidation of nuclear and chemical weapons insisting that it should be accompanied by a substantial cut in conventional weapons. It is obvious that the disarmament question can be successfully solved only through a unitary approach of all its aspects, in harmony with the imperative of guaranteeing the right to peace and equal security to all states.

Romania has constantly worked to encourage military dialogue on the continent and a passage to concrete conventional disarmament measures. It proposed, alongside the other states participating in the Warsaw Treaty, the beginning of direct negotiations among the states in the two military alliances on the diminution of military allowances and the declaration of a 1-to-2-year moratorium on their increase. As is known, by consulting the Romanian people in 1986 Romania passed on to unilaterally cut conventional weapons and troops by 5 per cent and military spending by 10 per cent, calling upon the other states to follow the same way. Similar decisions, recently announced by a number of other socialist states, consolidate the pioneer's action of Romania in this domain.

YUGOSLAVIA

Foreign Secretary Loncar Addresses CSCE Ministerial Talks

AU1603180089 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
9 Mar 89 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed report on speech by Budimir Loncar, SFRY federal secretary for foreign affairs, at the CSCE ministerial meeting in Vienna on 8 March: "All European Countries Could Reduce Their Armed Forces"]

[Text] "It is true that only time can confirm or refute the accuracy of the assessment on the exceptional importance of the previous meeting in Vienna. Europe expects much

from the upcoming negotiations, both from the continuation of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe, and from the meeting of 23 countries on conventional armed forces, within the framework of the CSCE. This is rightly expected. The international atmosphere has never been so favorable for substantive and major steps to strengthen peace and security. I do not want to reiterate the well-known circumstances that contributed to this climate, nor the results that have been achieved. I would only like, if you allow me, to inform this session on behalf of Yugoslavia, as a member of the Nonaligned Movement, on the movement's almost undivided resolve to carry out its own modernization under the new conditions—to which the movement had significantly contributed itself—to act in a more stimulating and creative way toward positive trends in international relations.

"The main question is how to make the current positive trends permanent and stable, for this is now not only a matter of relaxing tensions and of detente, which in the past used to be provisional and on several occasions broken. We have now entered a space whose coordinates are wider and more definite: We have embarked on the process of disarmament, a system which contains measures for trust and inspection, a serious reduction in the ideological level and nature of interrelations, and the reaffirmation of human rights as the vital dimension of international confidence. In fact, in practice we have already gone beyond the old notion of detente.

"What should be the new stage of negotiations on measures needed to strengthen confidence and security under these conditions? Can one still think in terms of a routine approach when we have conditions for a bolder and more creative approach? Let us go further.

"What does this involve?

"First, a balanced development of a system of measures; in other words, we need to make up for a delay concerning, above all, the measures to limit military activities. The Stockholm document only deals with these in a modest way. The value of a comprehensive and regular exchange of views on military activities cannot be questioned, but reducing their level and intensity is even more important.

"The second factor refers to the extension of measures concerning the military forces' independent naval and air activities. As long as military activities freely take place in the seas and oceans surrounding Europe, and as long as there is no system of information, control, or restriction, then peace, security, and confidence will remain on shaky ground. This particularly refers to places where there is an excessive presence of the great powers' naval forces, such as in the Mediterranean.

"After all, let us today try to answer the classic question: Do countries arm themselves because there is no confidence, or is the lack of confidence a consequence of the

accumulation of arms? Mutual confidence is directly linked to the original and ultimate aims of us all. The central feature of the present era is in fact the global and growing interdependence that renders completely anachronistic the logic of one side's difficulties and regression benefiting the other side. The fact is that, in relations between the superpowers and blocs, as well as within the CSCE process, we first attained confidence-building measures, and then measures to control arms, and only then the first measures concerning real disarmament. However, it has been demonstrated that we cannot halt the apocalyptic advance of arms with confidence-building measures, arms control, and disarmament alone.

"The nonaligned and neutral countries, which entirely rely on their own defense forces, are profoundly interested in confidence, disarmament, and the stabilization of the situation in Europe, not because they have been, by the nature of their status, 'deprived' of the protection of one or the other alliances, if one can at all speak of this, but because their interests are identical with joint and general European interests. This is why they can still be a catalyst in the search for new solutions. Be assured that in future negotiations, Yugoslavia, as an active participant in the Stockholm conference, will, jointly with other nonaligned and neutral countries which are participants in the CSCE talks, contribute as much as possible to the substantive and efficient work.

"Yugoslavia is not a participant in the negotiations on reducing conventional armed forces, but is, as a European country, directly interested in their main aim: the creation of a stable and secure equilibrium of conventional forces at an ever lower level. For this reason, Yugoslavia will cooperate most closely with all the participants in the negotiations, regardless of what grouping they belong to. This is because it considers the opportunity to bridge some old divisions to be one of the most precious results of the CSCE talks."

Method of Negotiations

"The method of negotiations involving only a few countries that participate in the CSCE is a new method, and the extent of its purposefulness and usefulness will only be demonstrated in the future. It can be inferred that those bloc countries that face each other in central Europe will be the first ones to start reducing their forces, which means the negotiations, too. But this is conditional, because we admit that this kind of solution does not, from a long-term point of view, correspond to the

need for an all-around treatment of security in Europe—to an indivisible type of security, which is one of principles contained in the Final Act.

"The essence of the information links between the negotiations of the 23 countries and the CSCE does not lie in its sheer form, but above all in the content that it will be given. This is because as we are declaring ourselves in favor of protecting the interests of the security of all CSCE participants, this would represent a chance to hold talks within the group of 35 countries in a way that would contribute to a successful outcome of negotiations among the group of 23 countries."

Against Subordination and Group Discipline

"Our appeal must therefore be both joint and clear—let us do our utmost so that both negotiating processes are carried out in a creative spirit, so that they are productive, so that they do not take a course of sterile rivalry. Our experience does not allow us to have any illusions that the negotiations are going to be easy and simple, but our experiences teach us that we should create the best possible conditions for them. In this context, allow me to assess the USSR's announced reduction of its military forces and arms in Europe—and those of some other Warsaw Pact member states—as very important.

"The process of security and disarmament in Europe would indeed receive not only an additional but a truly significant potential if all the countries simply reduced their conventional forces and weapons. Let that be, shall we say, by 10 percent. Nonaligned Yugoslavia, let me remind you, took this type of step last year by reducing its total forces by 12 percent.

"The process of disarmament, with all of its political-psychological and economic causes and consequences, as well as confidence-building measures, inevitably lead to a freer and more democratic organization not only of relations among different countries, but also of relations inside individual countries. Under conditions of a reduced or eliminated threat, it is increasingly difficult to justify the necessity for internal pressures and stagnation by referring to external threats; the credibility of group discipline and subordination is constantly decreasing.

"The Helsinki project is not only an exalted ideal. Europe is closer to it than ever before," stated Budimir Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs, at the conclusion of his speech.

INDIA

Reporter Tells Problems of Launching Indigenous IRBM

46001294z Madras THE HINDU in English
25 Jan 89 p 9

[Article: "IRBM Test Any Time"]

[Text] New Delhi, Jan. 24—India's Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) project's technology demonstrator missile is likely to be tested any time now. Observers say the test of the missile, which was fabricated a year ago and has been on readiness-status for the past eight months, has been held up awaiting signal from the top political leadership, the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi. The test was expected some time in September-October 1988 but postponed because it was felt that with the death of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, it could adversely affect the electoral outcome in Pakistan and hinder improvement of bilateral relations. After the elections, however, the test was stalled pending Mr. Gandhi's visit to Pakistan and Beijing.

Defence analysts, while generally agreeing that the test would have had an adverse impact on the emerging relations with Pakistan, however question the wisdom of the postponement because in respect of China, it would have given India some stature in its dealings with the latter which, after all is nuclear armed and has been the only country on record to have supplied IRBM missiles to a third country, Saudi Arabia.

There is a feeling among a section of Mr. Gandhi's advisers that the test could also have an adverse fallout in U.S. administration circles where the Indian Government is attempting to capitalise on the improved climate of relations. Further, it is felt the test should be carried out after February-March when the nature of the U.S. arms package to Pakistan will become clearer. As of now only the wish-list is visible, but once Congressional committees go into session next month, it will be known whether any qualitative changes have taken place to justify the Government's optimism.

Negative impact: While the Government is completely justified in taking into account the wider ramifications of such a test, the long postponement has had a negative impact on the missile programme as such since further flight tests of the Prithvi battlefield support missile, the first of which was held on February 25 last year, have been held up with the support personnel deployed 'on-hold' for the Agni test.

According to some defence specialists, the test of the Agni goes beyond many of these calculations. They argue that the prolonged setbacks that have affected the civilian launch vehicle programme make it imperative that India retain the technological momentum it gained with

the SLV-3'S success. One way of ensuring this is to encourage the military programme which has an autonomous base and which can in no time be adapted for civilian use.

The two-stage Agni demonstrator has a solid-fuelled first stage and a liquid-fuelled second stage. A successful test would immediately place India in a qualitatively different slot in terms of defence capability. However, the current dilemma facing New Delhi is not technological but political.

The political aspects are not just international opinion, but the inability to move ahead with the setting up of a national missile testing range at Baliapal in Orissa in the face of a local agitation. The defence establishment stands bemused: it has made remarkable strides in missile technology only to be confronted with a situation where it may have no place to rest and launch the missile. The Agni test when it comes will take place from an old range nearby at Chandipur-on-sea, which has been designated as an interim test range.

Pakistan Rocket Test Embarrasses Indian Officials

46001299z Madras THE HINDU in English
1 Feb 89 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, Jan 31. Reports from Karachi indicating that Pakistan has successfully test-fired a multi-stage rocket with a scientific payload of 150 kg to an altitude of 640 km have predictably created embarrassment among top aides of the government who had been blocking the test of the Indian IRBM technology demonstrator Agni on the excuse that it would impair the emerging Indo-Pakistan entente.

More alarming has been the failure of the Indian intelligence agencies to provide any advance information on the subject even though the launch was carried out on January 10 from the testing range at Sonmiani near Karachi. The first inkling of the test came through the report carried in a well-known Karachi daily, DAWN.

Defence analysts are at a loss to understand this most recent development which would imply that Pakistan could develop intermediate range ballistic missiles since the rocket tested on January 10 was a multi-stage one. Based on the *Dawn* report as it appeared in the Indian press, some specialists say that the rocket would be of the augmented space launch vehicle (ASLV) category since it boosted the payload of 150 kg to a 640 km altitude. Converted into a military missile, it would have a range of 1,500-2,000 km and perhaps more.

Mixed record: India's civilian launch vehicle programme has had a mixed record. After successfully designing the SLV-3 launch vehicle (capable of being converted into a 1500-2000 km range IRBM), it has had setbacks with the first two launches of its ASLV vehicle proving to be

failures. The military programme has so far been successful with the test launches of a SAM system, Trishul, and a surface-to-surface missile system, Prithvi with a range of 250 km and 1000 kg payload.

Indian officials were sceptical of the previous reported launch (May 1988) of a battlefield support missile capable of carrying a 1000 kg warhead to a distance of 650 km. They argued without specific information however that Pakistan had had no previous record of missile launching capability and that given the technical difficulties that India had faced, it was unlikely that Pakistan could have overcome them.

U.S. report: In 1987, an update of a U.S. Congressional Research Service report on ballistic missile proliferation did not even list Pakistan as having a missile programme. It noted however that Pakistan had a modest space programme using sounding rockets under cooperative programmes with the U.S., Britain and France. These very simple rockets carry payloads of 2-10 kg to heights of 50-60 km. It is not easy to base larger space launch vehicles or missile programmes on this low level technology. The report noted, "Pakistan is not at the

same level as Brazil and far behind India in this area". The report gave a fairly detailed picture of the Indian missile and space programmes as it did of the Brazilian and Argentinian ones.

Last year the then Senator and now U.S. Vice-President, Mr Dan Quayle, issued a report which was based on the CRS findings as well as other published material, and the Pakistani test of May was cited. Curiously, the Pakistani test was reported in the *New York Times* and not any Pakistani or Indian newspaper.

One line of thinking is that the Pakistani launches have been through Chinese launchers such as the one that was provided to the Saudis. The May 1988 missile too could have been a Chinese M-9 missile which is reported to have a 600 km range. There is an element of suspicion in Pakistani claims since unlike the Indian programme which has been fairly open, with the Press visiting the missile design facilities and the Doordarshan running a clip of the test-launch of the Prithvi, the news of Pakistani tests and launches are not independently verifiable. Nevertheless in the context of the continuous stream of reports confirming the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme, India is likely to be compelled to look at its own programmes which are under an enforced holiday of sorts for the past 10 months.

**Letter Urges Merging NATO, Warsaw Pact
Forces Under UN Command**
*52000021 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE
in English No 1 Jan 89 pp 8-10*

[Letter to the editor by Yuliy Kim, "writer," Moscow:
"Bridge Across the Abyss"]

[Text] The nuclear confrontation of the two blocs has resulted in the realization of its futility. No victory is possible, initiative is suicidal, humanity's eternity faces the real alternative of death.

Even if nuclear parity and policy of deterrent have meant for the planet half century of relative calm, anyone can see that this has been a forced, temporary and unreliable policy, that even agreed cuts and moratoriums would not eliminate but rather encourage constant efforts to make the weapon still more lethal and in no way prevent its spread, easy production and use.

While arms cuts in conditions of confrontation may alleviate the peril, it surely is here to stay. Suppose we agree to cut weapons by 50 percent, then by 70 percent or even 90 percent, but there would surely remain minimal stockpiles that could fully neutralize the enemy. This goes to show that neither we nor they need the number of weapons to destroy one another five times over. But a certain number is needed for a single-strike destruction.

Cuts cannot stop the further progress of scientific and technological thought. Generally, it cannot be stopped by anything but omnicide. And this is fine. What we have to stop is bad policy, not thought.

They say that there should be an arsenal sufficient for defence. But the nuclear age makes nonsense of the word "defence:" if the enemy prepares for a nuclear attack, a preemptive strike seems to be in order, but which of the sides will then be doing the defending?

Two rams met on a narrow bridge over an abyss butting one another, their horns locked so that if either pushes the other over, both would fall to their death. In the meantime advancing on both is a dark rock with this ominous sign: "Ecological death." The adversaries are obliged to turn to the rock and to try to hold it back, jointly.

The nuclear confrontation of the two blocs has made nonsense of war as a means of solving issues because a modern war can only be a nuclear war and will only end in omnicide.

Hence, the only way is to end the confrontation.

This means renouncing enmity.

In the past, I remember, they spoke of the fatal inevitability of wars between socialism and capitalism, the fatalism was abolished and they started to talk about the "class antagonism" which was supposed to establish socialism everywhere, finally.

But our top leaders declared:

—peaceful coexistence of the two blocs is not a form of class struggle;

—the interests of humanity are above class interests.

So it follows that:

—capitalism is not necessarily hostile to socialism and vice versa;

—class cooperation is possible in the face of shared problems.

I think it is a heavy blow to many of our social scientists and ideologists who are trying to keep class hatred on the boil in the hearts of our citizens, who always describe the West as "rotting," who divide the whole world into "they" and "we," who are always watching those who "bring grist to 'their' mill."

So, given all the fundamental differences between the socio-economic structures, enmity and antagonism between them are not unavoidable.

I can also add that there are several common issues solution of which has long demanded joint action: the ecological crisis, the energy crisis, the population crisis, etc. The economic crisis in the USSR is the one I'm more familiar with.

All I read every day in every newspaper leads me to the conclusion that, without Western help, we aren't likely to get out of the crisis soon. Continuation of the policy of military confrontation would not simply be ideological stupidity, it would be a crime against the country.

In Denmark, on my first trip to Europe, I saw how they live. This is the kind of future we should strive towards—I mean the living standard and culture of everyday life; a future our long-suffering people well deserve. The absence of queues and the presence of all sorts of goods, this would save us a third of our time and half of our nerves that we now wasted in shops. I'm trying to guess: Estonia could achieve this, under favourable conditions, in 15 years or so? And Kaluga? 50 years? A pity.

To hell with enmity! We need their help: their credit, their goods, their technology—we need their friendship, we should be partners, not rivals: without each other we would not be able to cope with the crises besetting us.

More so because both sides would have to deal with another dark rock called the military-industrial complex and with ideologists on both sides who view confrontation as a natural law as we move not towards detente—as this is not enough today—towards a union.

Our press coyly writes that the military-industrial complex exists only in the West. Yet here, in this country, we come up at every step against the outsize monster that devours our finest intellectual potential. And there is every reason to believe that the Western monster costs the West less and it is in many respects superior to our own plodding monster.

Yes, it's a monster, a hulk, a hobgoblin—these are the only words that can describe both the Western and our MICs designed to frighten because, as I've already said, the nuclear fist cannot be used, and it can't be anything but nuclear. So it hangs over the world like a dirty cloud as it gets bigger with the lethal dirt, and it commands no respect whatsoever.

War has stopped being a political tool.

A fist incapable of winning—who needs it?

But, despite this, millions upon millions of people are toiling day and night for war, for omnicide or rather for nothing, because it is unthinkable, especially today, that someone actually presses the button.

This gigantic and meaningless work generates gigantic inertia in people. The production of weapons gives jobs to too many people for it to be stopped easily. There is a lot of military officials, military manufacturers and military engineers who are in the habit of working for war and for nothing else, and numerous ideologists with a class affiliation and Sovietologists without a class affiliation who only think in terms of intolerance. So, people who want to carry through world wide peace projects have to contend with the powerful resistance of these people.

Can something be done before war has finally been rejected as a method?

Immediate and general disarmament would not be realistic.

Cutting weapons while there is confrontation would be ineffectual: there would always remain a certain amount of weapons liable to be increased at the slightest cooling of relations.

The only way to render weapons harmless and to ensure that they are steadily reduced to zero is to pool our arsenals.

I propose integrating headquarters, armies and navies instead of having NATO and the Warsaw Pact confronting each other.

This pool would be used purely for policing.

It would be commanded by the UN.

I don't think this is unrealistic, it is simply the only way out.

In conditions of confrontation, armies and the military make no sense.

In conditions of such a union they make sense.

The UN is the first variant or even a stage of an Earth Parliament. As the Parliament grows more efficient, its authority would grow.

The renunciation of confrontation between the two blocs would immeasurably enhance the role and efficiency of the world body. Already today the UN perform some policing duties. On a number of occasions it rendered useful service in different hot spots.

Possessing an integrated nuclear arsenal, the UN would be able to guarantee the Earth peace while mankind gets used to a non-violent way of life.

The above is an attempt on the part of a newspaper-reading Muscovite to formulate his own impressions of the situation and assess the immediate prospects. This writer will be very happy if his ideas draw some response.

U.S. Organization Accused of Selling 'Biological Weapons'

18070155 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 5 Mar 89 p 5

[Article by N. Suglovov: "Mail-Order Cholera"]

[Text] Where can one purchase...biological weapons? In any country in the world, this question will evoke at least surprise, but not in the United States. Anyone there who wishes to own "high-quality" bacilli or viruses may turn to "The American Type Culture Collection." The order and certified check for payment may be sent to: 12301 Parklawn Drive, Rockville, Maryland, 20852. And if time is of the essence, orders can be placed by phoning 301-881-2600. Foreign purchasers may send their certified checks to Riggs National Bank, Washington, D.C. 20007.

All of this information is taken from the catalog of "The American Type Culture Collection." There, in black and white, is written that the shipment of strains of microorganisms, including pathogens dangerous to humans, is done through...the mail. The bacilli packed in special containers "travel" thousands of miles from Rockville by airplane, train and ship. Bulk orders can be placed with a sliding discount. Anticipating misunderstandings, the compilers of the catalog give notice that "individuals or organizations which obtain samples of biological cultures assume full responsibility for the risk of their use."

What sort of goods are offered to the regular and occasional user of the rich collection of the "American Type Culture Collection?" It turns out, practically all of the microorganisms known to science. In the "Bacteria" section alone, hundreds of strains of cholera, plague, typhus, botulism, tularemia and other infectious bacilli are represented. There are no fewer representatives of the especially virulent pathogenic species in the catalog's sections of "Viruses" and "Microspores."

A book by the well-known experts in the field of biological warfare C. Pillar and K. Yamamoto was recently published in the United States: "Genetic War: Military Control of the New Genetic Technology." It enumerates the biological substances which the scientific centers of the U.S. Army are developing to this day. A comparison of the inventory of the catalog of the "American Type Culture Collection" shows that in the Collection's stock are practically all of the types of biological warfare which are studied in the military-biological laboratories of the U.S. Army Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick.

"The American Type Culture Collection" was founded in 1925 as a private organization concerned exclusively with the collection, preservation and distribution of live microorganism cultures. The National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration and the World Health Organization give it financial support. Undoubtedly, the collection has vital significance for the development of biological sciences, and the 1972 International Convention on Biological Weapons does not forbid trade in dangerous microorganisms for peaceful aims for development and production of vaccines and sera.

At the same time, the lack of sufficiently strict control over the collection's activities by the American authorities creates a danger of its utilization by both terrorist organizations and countries interested in developing biological weapons.

One CIA document stated that 22 acts of terrorism using "exotic" types of biological weapons were registered from 1968 through 1980.

Secrecy in U.S. Defense Budget Process Discussed

*18070556a Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 10, 11-17 Mar 89 p 3*

[Commentary by L. Rodionova, scientific associate at the Institute of the USA and Canada: "The U.S. Defense Budget: Openness or Secrecy?"; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] They say that the USSR defense budget will soon be declassified. Would it not be expedient to use the experience of the United States in this work since the most varied information is published there about the activity of the defense department?

L. Rodionova, scientific associate at the Institute of the USA and Canada, comments on this.

In line with the principles of the U.S. Constitution, all spending on programs implemented by the departments is monitored by the main legislative organ—the U.S. Congress.

Scrutiny and approval of the Defense Department budget in the Congress take place in the form of hearings at which all matters connected with funding for the overwhelming majority of military programs are examined. These hearings take place separately in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Here, in most cases permission is given for public discussion by leaders in the Department of Defense of programs for the development of weapons systems. Not only members of the Congress and representatives of the Department of defense but also representatives of business circles and companies that are Defense department contractors, and of universities, state departments, public organizations and the press are invited.

At the end of the long and stormy debates, the reports containing the stenographic record of matters connected with the activity of the Department of Defense come out. And those reports are published.

It is important that the budget of the Defense Department is also carried in the press as part of the overall state budget.

In addition the annual report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress is published; this contains a reflection of virtually all defense issues, the main provisions of military policy and strategy, the military budget, the structure of personnel in the armed forces, programs for weapons systems development for the branches of the armed services, procurement costs for programs, expenditures for research and so forth.

These, in brief, are the kinds of democratic procedures of the open discussion of the U.S. defense budget.

But for any person with common sense it is obvious that national defense is a sphere of state management in which it is essential to keep state secrets and institute a regime of confidentiality. In the United States this problem is resolved in several ways. First, some of the hearings in the Congress take place behind closed doors or parts of open hearings are classified. But the main way to maintain secrecy is the existence within the frame

work of the overall defense budget of a so-called "black" or secret budget from which "black" military programs are funded. To some extent this concept is in line with the programs singled out in Department of Defense internal documents as programs for which special clearance is required.

The U-2 spy plane, for example, was developed within the framework of such programs, as were the cruise missile, intelligence-gathering satellites and the F-19 fighter.

Until recently "black" programs were totally hidden from the public gaze and even from the U.S. Congress itself. It has only been recently that information directly connected with the growing spending on these programs has been carried on the pages of American newspapers and journals, where not only are there cost assessments of the secret military budget but the question is also being raised of how necessary such top secret programs are.

Spending for all programs is reflected in the U.S. military budget.

The "black" programs are hidden in the Department of Defense budget by various means. First, spending for a "black" program is not shown in the spending items but described under a code name that has nothing to do with them, for example, "White Bear," or as a very general description that does not reveal the essential nature of the item. In this case only the total sum is indicated for the allocation for the program. A second method is to cover spending on "black" programs in quite different budget items. These could be military developments, spending for military personnel, or operating expenses. In principle the secret budget can be hidden in any item of the military budget, and this creates enormous difficulties for calculating the amount. For example, in the Air Force, under names that mention nothing about budget allocations, such as "selected activities" or "other production expenses" American experts have found \$13 billion of "black" spending.

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